Part 10 (1/2)

The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building a bridge, all of them _can_ do every single act--if need arise--and the result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident.

Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying:

”There is something in the organism's behaviour--in the widest sense of the word--which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e.

to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism 'a typically combined body' (i.e., a machine), without further explanation.”[73]

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE.--The problem is: What is it in an organism which causes it to behave in a fas.h.i.+on so impossible for any machine? To answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it _entelechy_, i.e. ”purposiveness,” and he also speaks of _psychoids_, i.e. ”primitive minds.” Names do not carry us very far; but the mere fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is important. It const.i.tutes an admission on their part that there is something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious causes if known ones can be found. The _deus ex machina_ method seems to them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were considered solved merely by the word ”mystery,” knowledge would never advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but things that are important. But in this particular instance the application of the name _entelechy_ indicates that, in the opinion of such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And Driesch is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living organism in terms of physics and chemistry.

RESULTS OF THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if life resists all attempts to reduce it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative att.i.tude, and seek to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to be re-interpreted in terms of biology.

”It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and chemical world as we now conceive it--the world of atoms and energy--will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure mathematicians.”[74]

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.--Not only physical and biological, but psychological science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, and of so-called ”spiritualism.” In none of these spheres can research yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of research in psychical regions which is practically a _terra incognita_.

And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems is perhaps the right att.i.tude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodes. It is extremely difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses ”mind”

from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a comparatively insignificant ”epiphenomenon” accompanying certain obscure chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their simplicity, will no longer cover the facts.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.--One particular branch of experimental psychology, which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the existence of ”disembodied spirits,” human or otherwise. The whole subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic statements in any direction.

What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of various _phenomena_ which it is extremely difficult to explain in accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of s.p.a.ce, or of mental action.

The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over the _explanation_ of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new facts will force from conservative scientists is _a radical revision of current notions of the range of human mental action_. The mind is evidently capable of producing certain effects--even upon matter--which would have seemed incredible a short while ago.

So much is the least that may be expected. But in the view of many competent and highly scientific observers, some far more radical revision of our notions may be necessary. Some scientists of good repute (e.g. Sir Oliver Lodge, in England, and Flammarion and others on the Continent) are convinced that the facts can only adequately be explained by reference to another world--interlocked, as it were, with this.[75]

And it has to be admitted that this, what may be called more ”advanced”

explanation, is more in accordance than the other with a rather universal tradition or a.s.sumption of mankind in all ages.

It will be easily seen that the whole subject is one of the most extreme difficulty. There is a general hesitancy in accepting what is called the ”spirit hypothesis,” so long as any other can be found; a hesitancy justified in view of the extreme complexity of the world we live in (where so much is even yet unknown), and in view of the great difficulty which there seems to be in adducing _exact_ proofs of the ”spirit theory.”

A REASONABLE ATt.i.tUDE.--We shall, no doubt, be wise at present to refuse to cry ”Proven,” and whilst admitting that all things are possible--perhaps even probable--to await with patience the results of further investigation.

It has to be admitted that, while many people are superst.i.tious and easily attracted by picturesque theories, there are others who are as prejudiced, in their way, against new ideas, as were those astronomers who, being committed to Ptolemaic views, refused to look through Galileo's telescope. It is not only theologians who have, in the history of thought, been guilty of obscurantism. In the early days of hypnotic experiments the scientific world in general ”pooh-poohed” the idea of hypnotism; and it took a considerable time before it would allow itself to be convinced that such a thing was possible. Facts, in the end, were too strong even for prejudice. It is facts, eventually, that decide matters; and, no doubt, before a very long period has elapsed, sufficient facts will have acc.u.mulated to allow the scientific world to form more definite and better-grounded opinions than are possible to-day.

Meanwhile, the ordinary man will do well to remember that the universe is really a very wonderful place, and that the knowledge of the wisest of us about it can only be described as infinitesimal. The traditions of nineteenth-century materialism are still strong amongst us, even with those who are least conscious of them. But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that philosophy.

RESULTS.--These new conceptions of matter, of life, and of mind, which are the products of the new physics, the new biology, and the new psychology respectively, may be confidently left to themselves to work out their own salvation. They have the strength of youth. What is evident is that we have crossed the threshold of a new era in the history of science. The outlook of the future will be as different from that of the recent past as was the new science of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton from the dogmatic but fanciful notions which the Scholastic theologians had borrowed from Aristotle, and sought to impose as a permanent revelation.

The current of thought is never stayed. The future is obscure, but one thing is certain, that the coming generations will see catastrophic changes in the outlook of science; and the materialistic and mechanistic _weltanschauung_, which lately seemed so formidable, may soon become as superannuated as astrology. The theory which overshadowed the religious life of a century, and which had become more and more menacing as scientific knowledge increased in extent and popularity, has fallen into discredit. Its prestige will not revive.

CHAPTER XIII

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

VALUE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--It may perhaps be felt that our protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is only too evident that, as the poet says:

”Our little systems have their day, They have their day, and cease to be.”

And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers, indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in the history of philosophy--such as Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_--which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress (a.s.suming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still justified in a.s.suming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting nearer to the goal.