Part 6 (1/2)

Seventy miles from the city lies the Oder River. An army might enter Germany by this gate and turn the line of Germany's frontier fortresses. The Oder had been well fortified, but an invader coming from Cracow might move upon the western bank. The Russian plan no doubt was to threaten both enemy capitals. Moreover, an advance of Russia from Cracow would take its armies into Silesia, full of coal and iron mines, and one of the greatest manufacturing districts in the German Empire. This would be a real success, and all Germany would feel the blow.

Another reason for the Russian advance in Galicia was her desire to control the Galician oil wells. To Germany petrol had become one of the foremost munitions of war. Since she could not obtain it from either America or Russia she must get it from Austria, and the Austrian oil fields were all in Galicia. This, in itself, would explain the Galician campaign. Moreover, through the Carpathian Mountains it was possible to make frequent raids into Hungary, and Russia understood well the feeling of Hungary toward her German allies. She hoped that when Hungary perceived her regiments sacrificed and her plains overrun by Russian troops, she would regret that she had allowed herself to be sacrificed to Prussian ambition. The Russians, therefore, suddenly, moved toward Cracow.

Then von Hindenburg came to the rescue. The supreme command of the Austrian forces was given to him. The defenses of Cracow were strengthened under the direction of the Germans, and a German army advanced from the Posen frontier toward the northern bank of the Vistula. The advance threatened the Russian right, and, accordingly, within ten days' march of Cracow, the Russians stopped. The German offensive in Poland had begun. The news of the German advance came about the fifth of October. Von Hindenburg, who had been fighting in East Prussia, had at last perceived that nothing could be gained there. The vulnerable part of Russia was the city of Warsaw. This was the capital of Poland, with a population of about three-quarters of a million. If he could take Warsaw, he would not only have pleasant quarters for the winter but Russia would be so badly injured that no further offensive from her need be antic.i.p.ated for a long period. Von Hindenburg had with him a large army. In his center he probably had three-quarters of a million men, and on his right the Austrian army in Cracow, which must have reached a million.

Counting the troops operating in East Prussia and along the Carpathians, and the garrison of Przemysl, the Teuton army must have had two and a half million soldiers. Russia, on the other hand, though her mobilization was still continuing, at this time could not have had as many as two million men in the whole nine hundred miles of her battle front.

The fight for Warsaw began Friday, October 16th, and continued for three days, von Hindenburg being personally in command. On Monday the Germans found themselves in trouble. A Russian attack on their left wing had come with crus.h.i.+ng force. Von Hindenburg found his left wing thrown back, and the whole German movement thrown into disorder. Meanwhile an attempt to cross the Vistula at Josefov had also been a failure. The Russians allowed the Germans to pa.s.s with slight resistance, waited until they arrived at the village Kazimirjev, a district of low hills and swampy flats, and then suddenly overwhelmed them.

Next day the Russians crossed the river themselves, and advanced along the whole line, driving the enemy before them, through great woods of spruce out into the plains on the west. This forest region was well known to the Russian guides, and the Germans suffered much as the Russians had suffered in East Prussia. Ruzsky, the Russian commander, pursued persistently; the Germans retreating first to Kielce, whence they were driven, on the 3d of November, with great losses, and then being broken into two pieces, with the north retiring westward and the south wing southwest toward Cracow.

Rennenkampf's attack on the German left wing was equally successful, and von Hindenburg was driven into full retreat. The only success won during this campaign was that in the far south where Austrian troops were sweeping eastward toward the San. This army drove back the Russians under Ivanov, reoccupied Jaroslav and relieved Przemysl. This was a welcome relief to Przemysl, for the garrison was nearly starved, and it was well for the garrison that the relief came, for in a few days the Russians returned, recaptured Jaroslav and reinvested Przemysl. As von Hindenburg retreated he left complete destruction in his wake, roads, bridges, railroad tracks, water towers, railway stations, all were destroyed; even telegraph posts, broken or sawn through, and insulators broken to bits.

It was now the turn of Russia to make a premature advance, and to pay for it. Doubtless the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose strategy up to this point had been so admirable, knew very well the danger of a new advance in Galicia, but he realized the immense political as well as military advantages which were to be obtained by the capture of Cracow. He therefore attempted to move an army through Poland as well as through Galicia, hoping that the army in Poland would keep von Hindenburg busy, while the Galician army would deal with Cracow.

The advance was slow on account of the damaged Polish roads. It was preceded by a cavalry screen which moved with more speed. On November 10th, the vanguard crossed the Posen frontier and cut the railway on the Cracow-Posen line. This reconnaissance convinced the Russian general that the German army did not propose to make a general stand, and it seemed to him that if he struck strongly with his center along the Warta, he might destroy the left flank of the German southern army, while his own left flank was a.s.saulting Cracow. He believed that even if his attack upon the Warta failed, the Russian center could at any rate prevent the enemy from interfering with the attack further south upon Cracow.

GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS FROM THE AIR

A gas attack on the eastern front photographed by a Russian airman.

The movement therefore began, and by November 12th, the Russian cavalry had taken Miechow on the German frontier, about twenty miles north of Cracow. Its main forces were still eighty miles to the east. About this time Grand Duke Nicholas perceived that von Hindenburg was preparing a counter stroke. He had retreated north, and then, by means of his railways, was gathering a large army at Thorn. Large reinforcements were sent him, some from the western front, giving him a total of about eight hundred thousand men. In his retreat from Warsaw, while he had destroyed all roads railways in the south and west, he had carefully preserved those of the north already planning to use them in another movement. He now was beginning an advance, once again, against Warsaw. On account of the roads he perceived that it would be difficult for the Russians to obtain reinforcements. Von Hindenburg had with him as Chief of Staff General von Ludendorff, one of the cleverest staff officers in the German army, and General von Mackensen, a commander of almost equal repute.

The Russian army in the north had been pretty well scattered. The Russian forces were now holding a front of nearly a thousand miles, with about two million men. The Russian right center, which now protected Warsaw from the new attack could hardly number more than two hundred thousand men. Von Hindenburg's aim was Warsaw only, and did not affect directly the Russian advance to Cracow, which was still going on. Indeed, by the end of the first week in December, General Dmitrieff had cavalry in the suburbs of Cracow, and his main force was on the line of the River Rava about twelve miles away. Cracow had been strongly fortified, and much entrenching had been done in a wide circle around the city.

The German plan was to use its field army in Cracow's defense rather than a garrison. Two separate forces were used; one moving southwest of Cracow along the Carpathian hills, struck directly at Ivanov's left; the other, operating from Hungary, threatened the Russian rear. These two divisions struck at the same time and the Russians found it necessary to fight rear actions as they moved forward. They were doing this with reasonable success and working their way toward Cracow, when, on the 12th of December, the Austrian forces working from Hungary carried the Dukla Pa.s.s. This meant that the Austrians would be able to pour troops down into the rear of the Russian advance, and the Russian army would be cut off. Dmitrieff, therefore, fell rapidly back, until the opening of the Dukla Pa.s.s was in front of his line, and the Russian army was once more safe.

Meanwhile the renewed seige of Przemysl was going on with great vigor, and attracting the general attention of the Allied world. The Austrians attempted to follow up their successes at the Dukla Pa.s.s by attempting to seize the Lupkow Pa.s.s, and the Uzzok Pa.s.s, still further to the east, but the Russians were tired of retreating. New troops had arrived, and about the 20th of December a new advance was begun.

With the right of the army swinging up along the river Nida, northeast of Cracow, the Russian left attacked the Dukla Pa.s.s in great force, driving Austrians back and capturing over ten thousand men. On Christmas Day all three great western pa.s.ses were in Russian hands. The Austrian fighting, during this period, was the best they had so far shown, the brunt of it being upon the Hungarian troops, who, at this time, were saving Germany.

Meantime von Hindenburg was pursuing his movement in the direction of Warsaw. The Russian generals found it difficult to obtain information. Each day came the chronicle of contests, some victories, some defeats, and it soon appeared that a strong force was crus.h.i.+ng in the Russian outposts from the direction of Thorn and moving toward Warsaw. Ruzsky found himself faced by a superior German force, and was compelled to retreat. The Russian aim was to fall back behind the river Bzura, which lies between the Thorn and Warsaw. Bzura is a strong line of defense, with many fords but no bridges. The Russian right wing pa.s.sed by the city of Lowicz, moved southwest to Strykov and then on past Lodz. West of Lowicz is a great belt of marshes impossible for the movement of armies.

The first German objective was the city of Lodz. Von Hindenburg knew that he must move quickly before the Russians should get up reserves. His campaign of destruction had made it impossible for aid to be sent to the Russian armies from Ivanov, far in the south, but every moment counted. His right pushed forward and won the western crossings of the marshes. His extreme left moved towards Plock, but the main effort was against Piontek, where there is a famous causeway engineered for heavy transport through the marshes.

At first the Russians repelled the attack on the causeway, but on November 19th the Russians broke and were compelled to fall back. Over the causeway, then, the German troops were rushed in great numbers, splitting the Russian army into two parts; one on the south surrounding Lodz, and the other running east of Brezin on to the Vistula. The Russian army around Lodz was a.s.sailed on the front flank and rear. It looked like an overwhelming defeat for the Russian army. At the very last moment possible, Russian reinforcements appeared-a body of Siberians from the direction of Warsaw. They were thrown at once into the battle and succeeded in re-establis.h.i.+ng the Russian line. This left about ninety thousand Germans almost entirely surrounded, as if they were in a huge sack. Ruzsky tried his best to close the mouth of the sack, but he was unsuccessful. The fighting was terrific, but by the 26th the Germans in the sack had escaped.

The Germans were continually receiving reinforcements and still largely outnumbered the Russians. Von Hindenburg therefore determined on a new a.s.sault. The German left wing was now far in front of the Russian city of Lodz, one of the most important of the Polish cities. The population was about half a million. Such a place was a constant danger, for it was the foundation of a Russian salient.

When the German movement began the Russian general, perceiving how difficult it would have been to hold the city, deliberately withdrew, and on December 6th the Germans entered Lodz without opposition.

The retreat relieved the Russians of a great embarra.s.sment. Its capture was considered in Germany as a great German victory, and at this time von Hindenburg seems to have felt that he had control of the situation. His movement, to be sure, had not interfered with the Russian advance on Cracow, but Warsaw must have seemed to him almost in his power. He therefore concentrated his forces for a blow at Warsaw. His first new movement was directed at the Russian right wing, which was then north of the Bzura River and east of Lowicz. He also directed the German forces in East Prussia to advance and attempted to cut the main railway line between Warsaw and Petrograd. If this attempt had been successful it would have been a highly serious matter for the Russians. The Russians, however, defeated it, and drove the enemy back to the East Prussian border. The movement against the Russian right wing was more successful, and the Russians fell back slowly. This was not because they were defeated in battle, but because the difficult weather interfered with communications. There had been a thaw, and the whole country was waterlogged. The Grand Duke was willing that the Germans should fight in the mud.

This slow retreat continued from the 7th of December to Christmas Eve, and involved the surrender of a number of Polish towns, but it left the Russians in a strong position. They were able to entrench themselves so that every attack of the enemy Was broken. The Germans tried hard. Von Hindenburg would have liked to enter Warsaw on Christmas. The citizens heard day and night the sound of the cannon, but they were entirely safe.

The German attack was a failure. On the whole, the Grand Duke Nicholas had shown better strategy than the best of the German generals. Outnumbered from the very start, his tactics had been admirable. Twice he had saved Warsaw, and he was still threatening Cracow. The Russian armies were fighting with courage and efficiency, and were continually growing in numbers as the days went by.

During the first weeks of 1915 while there were a number of attacks and counter attacks both armies had come to the trench warfare, so familiar in France. The Germans in particular had constructed a most elaborate trench system, with underground rooms containing many of the ordinary comforts of life. Toward the end of the month the Russians began to move in East Prussia in the north and also far south in the Bukovina. The object of these movements was probably to prevent von Hindenburg from releasing forces on the west. Russia was still terribly weak in equipment and was not ready for a serious advance. An attack on sacred East Prussia would stir up the Germans, while Hungary would be likewise disturbed by the advance on Bukovina. Von Hindenburg, however, was still full of the idea of capturing Warsaw. He had failed twice but the old Field Marshal was stubborn and moreover he knew well what the capture of Warsaw would mean to Russia, and so he tried again.