Part 8 (1/2)
M. Stambulivski retorted: ”My head matters little, Sire. What matters more is the good of our country.”
The King paid no more attention to him, and took M. Gueshoff and M. Danoff apart, who again insisted on convoking the Chamber, and a.s.sured him that M. Radoslavoff's government would be in a minority. They also referred to the Premier's oracular utterances.
”Ah!” said the King. ”Has Radoslavoff spoken to you, and what has he said?”
”He has said-” replied the leaders, ”that Bulgaria would march with Germany and attack Serbia.”
The King made a vague gesture, and then said: ”Oh, I did not know.”
This incident throws a strong light upon the conflict which was going on in the Balkan states, between those Kings who were of German origin, and who believed in the German power, and their people who loved Russia. King Ferdinand got his warning. He did not listen, and he lost his throne. All this, however, took place before the Bulgarian declaration of war. Yet much had already shown what King Ferdinand was about to do. The Allies, to be sure, were incredulous, and were doing their best to cultivate the good will of the treacherous King, On September 23rd the official order was given for Bulgaria's mobilization. She, however, officially declared that her position was that of armed neutrality and that she had no aggressive intentions. As it has developed, she was acting under the direction of the German High Command.
It was at this period that Germany had failed to crash Russia in the struggle on the Vilna, and, in accordance with her usual strategy when one plan failed, another was undertaken. It seemed to her, therefore, that the punishment of Serbia would make up for other failures, and moreover would enable her to a.s.sist Turkey, which needed munitions, besides releasing for Germany supplies of food and other material which might come from Turkey.
They therefore entrusted an expedition against Serbia to Field Marshal von Mackensen, and had begun to gather an army for that purpose, north of the Danube.
This army of course was mainly composed of Austrian troops, but was stiffened throughout by some of the best regiments from the German army. To a.s.sist this new army they counted upon Bulgaria, with whom they had already a secret treaty, and in spite of the falsehoods issued from Sofia, the Bulgarian mobilization was meant for an attack on Serbia. The condition of affairs was well understood in Russia.
On October 2, 1915, M. Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued the following statement: ”The situation in the Balkans is very grave. The whole Russian nation is aroused by the unthinkable treachery of Ferdinand and his Government to the Slavic cause. Bulgaria owes her independence to Russia, and yet seems willing now to become a va.s.sal of Russia's enemies. In her att.i.tude towards Serbia, when Serbia is fighting for her very existence, Bulgaria puts herself in the cla.s.s with Turkey. We do not believe that the Bulgarian people sympathize with the action of their ruler therefore, the Allies are disposed to give them time for reflection. If they persist in their present treacherous course they must answer to Russia.” The next day the following ultimatum from Russia was handed the Bulgarian Prime Minister:
Events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this moment give evidence of the definite decision of King Ferdinand's Government to place the fate of its country in the hands of Germany. The presence of German and Austrian officers at the Ministry of War and on the staffs of the army, the concentration of troops in the zone bordering on Serbia, and the extensive financial support accepted from her enemies by the Sofia Cabinet, no longer leave any doubt as to the object of the present military preparations of Bulgaria. The powers of the Entente, who have at heart the realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people, have on many occasions warned M. Radoslavoff that any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as directed against themselves. The a.s.surances given by the head of the Bulgarian Cabinet in reply to these warnings are contradicted by facts. The representative of Russia, bound to Bulgaria by the imperishable memory of her liberation from the Turkish yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for fratricidal aggression against a Slav and allied people. The Russian Minister has, therefore, received orders to leave Bulgaria with all the staffs of the Legation and the Consulates if the Bulgarian Government does not within twenty-four hours openly break with the enemies of the Slav cause and of Russia, and does not at once proceed to send away the officers belonging to the armies of states who are at war with the powers of the Entente.
Similar ultimatums were presented by representatives of France and Great Britain. Bulgaria's reply to these ultimatums was described as bold to the verge of insolence. In substance she denied that German officers were on the staffs of Bulgarian armies, but said that if they were present that fact concerned only Bulgaria, which reserved the right to invite whomsoever she liked. The Bulgarian Government then issued a manifesto to the nation, announcing its decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. The manifesto reads as follows:
The Central Powers have promised us parts of Serbia, creating an Austro-Hungarian border line, which is absolutely necessary for Bulgaria's independence of the Serbians. We do not believe in the promises of the Quadruple Entente. Italy, one of the Allies, treacherously broke her treaty of thirty-three years. We believe in Germany, which is fighting the whole world to fulfill her treaty with Austria. Bulgaria must fight at the victor's side. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians are victorious on all fronts. Russia soon will have collapsed entirely. Then will come the turn of France.
Italy and Serbia. Bulgaria would commit suicide if she did not fight on the side of the Central Powers, which offer the only possibility of realizing her desire for a union of all Bulgarian peoples.
The manifesto also stated that Russia was fighting for Constantinople and the Dardanelles; Great Britain to destroy Germany's compet.i.tion; France for Alsace and Lorraine, and the other allies to rob foreign countries; the Central Powers were declared to be fighting to defend property and a.s.sure peaceful progress. The manifesto filled seven columns in the newspapers, and discussed at some length Bulgaria's trade interests. It attacked Serbia most bitterly, declaring that Serbia had oppressed the Bulgarian population of Macedonia in a most barbarous manner; that she had attacked Bulgarian territory and that the Bulgarian troops had been forced to fight for the defense of their own soil. In fact it was written in quite the usual German manner.
Long before this M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, had perceived what was coming. Greece was bound by treaty to a.s.sist Serbia if she were attacked by Bulgaria. On September 21st, Venizelos asked France and Britain for a hundred and fifty thousand troops. On the 24th, the Allies agreed to this and Greece at once began to mobilize. His policy was received with great enthusiasm in the Greek Chamber, and former Premier Gounaris, amid applause, expressed his support of the government.
On October 6th an announcement from Athens stated that Premier Venizelos had resigned, the King having informed him that he was unable to support the policy of his Minister. King Constantine was a brother-in-law of the German Emperor, and although professing neutrality he had steadily opposed M. Venizelos' policy. He had once before forced M. Venizelos' resignation, but at the general elections which followed, the Greek statesman was returned to power by a decisive majority.
SCENE OF GREAT ALLIED OFFENSIVE THAT DEFEATED BULGARIA IN SEPTEMBER, 1918
Intense indignation was caused by the King's action, though the King was able to procure the support of a considerable party. Venizelos' resignation was precipitated by the landing of the Allied troops in Saloniki. They had come at the invitation of Venizelos, but the opposition protested against the occupation of Greek territory by foreign troops. After a disorderly session in which Venizelos explained to the Chamber of Deputies the circ.u.mstances connected with the landing, the Chamber pa.s.sed a vote of confidence in the Government by 142 to 102. The substance of his argument may be found in his conclusion:
”We have a treaty with Serbia. If we are honest we will leave nothing undone to insure its fulfillment in letter and spirit. Only if we are rogues may we find excuses to avoid our obligations.”
Upon his first resignation M. Zaimis was appointed Premier, and declared for a policy of armed neutrality. This position was sharply criticised by Venizelos, but for a time became the policy of the Greek Government. Meantime the Allied troops were arriving at Saloniki. On October 3d, seventy thousand French troops arrived. A formal protest was made by the Greek commandant, who then directed the harbor officials to a.s.sist in arranging the landing. In a short time the Allied forces amounted to a hundred and fifty thousand men, but the German campaign was moving rapidly.
The German Balkan army captured Belgrade on the 9th of October, and by that date two Bulgarian armies were on the Serbian frontier. Serbia found herself opposed by two hundred thousand Austro-Germans and a quarter of a million Bulgarians. Greece and Roumania fully mobilized and were watching the conflict, and the small allied contingent at Saloniki was preparing to march inland to the aid of Serbia.
The conduct of Greece on this occasion has led to universal criticism. The King himself, no doubt, was mainly moved by his German wife and the influence of his Imperial brother-in-law. Those that were a.s.sociated with him were probably moved by fear. They had been much impressed by the strength of the German armies. They had seen the success of the great German offensive in Russia, while the French and British were being held in the West. They knew, too, the strength of Bulgaria. The national characteristic of the Greeks is prudence, and it cannot be denied that there was great reason to suppose that the armies of Greece would not be able to resist the new attack. With these views Venizelos, the greatest statesman that Greece had produced for many years, did not agree, and the election seemed to show that he was supported by the majority of the Greek people.
This was another case where the Allies, faced by a dangerous situation, were acting with too great caution. In Gallipoli they had failed, because at the very beginning they had not used their full strength. Now, again, knowing as they did all that depended upon it, bound as they were to the most loyal support of Serbia, the aid they sent was too small to be more than a drop in the bucket. It must be remembered, however, that the greatest leaders among the Allies were at all times opposed to in any way scattering their strength. They believed that the war was to be won in France. Military leaders in particular yielded under protest to the political leaders when expeditions of this character were undertaken.
Certainly this is true, that the world believed that Serbia had a right to Allied a.s.sistance. The gallant little nation was fighting for her life, and public honor demanded that she should be aided. It was this strong feeling that led to the action that was taken, in spite of the military opinions. It was, however, too late.