Part 7 (1/2)

'I have been told by the Russian Amba.s.sador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.'[107]

On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the Amba.s.sador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside'.

Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Amba.s.sador that

'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action.'[108]

Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:--

'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed.

Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every a.s.surance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland ... so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an a.s.surance that she would do likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.'[109]

This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British Government:--

'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy.

'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.

We could not entertain that bargain either.[110]

He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:--

'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely pa.s.sed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be a.s.sured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately ... The idea has. .h.i.therto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely pa.s.sed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.'

Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he received your communication without a comment.'[111]

But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely complain that no warning had been given to him.

With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir Rennell Rodd that he had

'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.'[112]

As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning.

Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it',[113] the French gave an unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a striking contrast:--

'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.'[115]

It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country', and he was asked to obtain an a.s.surance from the German Government similar to that given by France:--

'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116]