Part 8 (2/2)

_Italy's comments on the situation_.

We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official doc.u.ments. As early as July 25th the Italian Amba.s.sador in a conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military operations, but made a further suggestion that

'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone'.[162]

Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the practical suggestion that

'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]

Moreover the Italian Amba.s.sador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should

'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire Servian territory'.[166]

All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign Minister:--

'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Amba.s.sador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circ.u.mstances Italy would remain neutral.'[167]

The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.

NOTE

_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.

On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--

'I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a doc.u.ment of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]

It may be true, as the Austrian Amba.s.sador explained,[171] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit.

In this extraordinary doc.u.ment[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:--

A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration

(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries partic.i.p.ated in the propaganda;

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations.

B. That Servia should undertake

(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary;

(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;

(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against Austria-Hungary;

<script>