Part 20 (1/2)
SIR EDWARD GREY'S
CORRESPONDENCE
RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN
CRISIS
_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1914_
No. 13.
_Note communicated by Russian Amba.s.sador, July 25._
(Translation.)
M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:
”The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
”In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.
”In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.
”A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.
”Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.
”M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Amba.s.sador at Vienna.”
No. 17.
_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.)
(Telegraphic.) _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914.
I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.
On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency a.s.sured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.
Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establis.h.i.+ng her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her att.i.tude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.
I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.
I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He a.s.sured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.