Part 64 (1/2)
History states that Hideyos.h.i.+ thereafter treated this n.o.ble man with the greatest consideration, but it is difficult to reconcile that account with the fact that Hideyos.h.i.+ subsequently pressed Iehisa to guide the Osaka army through the mountains and rivers which const.i.tuted natural defences for the fief of Satsuma. Iehisa, of course, refused, and to Hideyos.h.i.+'s credit it stands on record that he did not press the matter with any violence. This difficulty of invading an unknown country without any maps or any guides, a country celebrated for its topographical perplexities, was ultimately overcome by sending Buddhist priests to act as spies in the dominions of s.h.i.+mazu. These spies were led by the abbot, Kennyo, with whose name the reader is already familiar, and as the s.h.i.+mazu family were sincere believers in Buddhism, no obstacles were placed in the way of the treacherous monks. They were able ultimately to guide the Osaka army through the forests and mountains on the north of Kagos.h.i.+ma, and Hideyos.h.i.+ adopted the same strategy as that pursued in a similar case three hundred years later, namely, sending a force of fifty thousand men by sea with orders to advance against Kagos.h.i.+ma from the south.
The Satsuma troops were completely defeated, and only the castle of Kagos.h.i.+ma remained in their hands.
At this stage of the campaign Hideyos.h.i.+ behaved with remarkable magnanimity and foresight. Contrary to the advice of some of his princ.i.p.al retainers, he refused to proceed to extremities against the s.h.i.+mazu clan, and agreed to make peace, on the basis that the clan should be left in possession of the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and Hyuga, the only further stipulation being that the then head of the house, Yos.h.i.+hisa, should abdicate in favour of his younger brother, Yos.h.i.+hiro. As for the Buddhist priests who had sacrificed their honour to their interests, those that had acted as guides to the invading army were subsequently crucified by order of the Satsuma baron, and the s.h.i.+n sect, to which they belonged, was interdicted throughout the whole of the s.h.i.+mazu fief. Yos.h.i.+hiro was summoned to Kyoto by Hideyos.h.i.+ to answer for this action, but he pleaded that such treachery amply deserved such punishment, and that he was prepared to bow to Hideyos.h.i.+'s judgment in the matter. The defence was admitted by Hideyos.h.i.+, but the abbot Kennyo received such large rewards that he was able to erect the great temple Nis.h.i.+ Hongwan-ji, ”which became the wonder of after-generations of men and which has often been erroneously referred to by foreign writers as a proof of the deep religious feelings of Buddhist converts three hundred years ago.”*
*A New Life of Hideyos.h.i.+, by W. Dening.
THE HOJO
From end to end of j.a.pan there were now only two powerful barons whose allegiance had not been formally rendered to Hideyos.h.i.+ and to the Emperor under the new regime. These were Date Masamune and Hojo Ujimasa. The origin and eminence of the Hojo family from the days of its founder, Nagauji, have already been described in these pages, and it need only be added here that Ujimasa enjoyed a reputation second to none of his predecessors. That he should stand aloof from all his brother barons seemed to the latter an intolerable evidence of pride, and they urged Hideyos.h.i.+ to resort at once to extreme measures. There can be no doubt that this was the intention of Hideyos.h.i.+ himself, but with characteristic prudence he had recourse at the outset to pacific devices. He therefore sent an envoy to the Hojo's stronghold at Odawara, urging Ujimasa to lose no time in paying his respects to the Court at Kyoto. The Hojo chief's reply was that Sanada Masayuki had encroached upon the Hojo estates in Numata, and that if this encroachment were rectified, the desired obeisance to the Throne would be made.
Thereupon, Hideyos.h.i.+ caused the restoration of Numata, but the Hojo baron, instead of carrying out his part of the agreement, made this restoration the pretext for an unwarrantable act of aggression.
Whatever sympathy might have been felt in Kyoto with the Hojo family was forfeited by this procedure, and in March, 1590, an army of over two hundred thousand men was set in motion for the Kwanto.
Hideyos.h.i.+'s troops moved in three columns. One, commanded by Ieyasu, marched by the seacoast road, the Tokaido; another, under Uesugi Kagekatsu and Maeda Tos.h.i.+ye, marched by the mountain road, the Tosando, and the third attacked from the sea. None of these armies encountered any very serious resistance. The first approached Odawara by the Hakone range and the second by way of the Usui pa.s.s. The castle at Odawara, however, was so strongly built and so stoutly held that its capture by storm seemed impossible, and Hideyos.h.i.+'s forces were obliged to have recourse to a regular siege which lasted nearly four months. During the latter part of that time, Hideyos.h.i.+ encouraged his soldiers to indulge in all sorts of amus.e.m.e.nts, and thus the camp of the besiegers constantly echoed the notes of musical performances and the shouts of dancers and sake drinkers. Finally, in July, 1590, the great fortress surrendered, and the Hojo baron, Ujimasa, was put to death, his head being sent to Kyoto for exposure, but the life of his son, Ujinao, was spared on condition that he enter a monastery.
HOJO UJINORI
One incident of this struggle is very characteristic of the ethics of the era. During the interchange of messages that preceded recourse to arms, the Hojo baron sent his brother, Ujinori, to Kyoto as an envoy to discuss the situation with Hideyos.h.i.+. The latter received Ujinori with all courtesy and endeavoured to impress upon him the imperative necessity of his chief's acquiescence. Ujinori promised to contribute to that end as far as lay in his power, but history describes him as adding: ”Should my brother fail to comply with your commands, and should it be necessary for you to send an army against the Kwanto, it must be clearly understood that this visit of mine to your Excellency shall not in any way prejudice my loyalty to my brother. On the contrary, if the peace be broken, I shall probably have to command the van of my brother's forces, and in that event I may have to offer to your Excellency a flight of my rusty arrows.”
Hideyos.h.i.+ is narrated to have laughingly replied that the peace was in no danger of being broken and that he trusted Ujinori to use his best endeavours to avert war. On his return to the Kwanto, Ujinori was ordered to defend the castle of Nira-yama with seven thousand men, and he soon found himself attacked by fifty thousand under seven of Hideyos.h.i.+'s generals. Ujinori reminded his comrades that Nira-yama had been the birthplace of the founder of the Hojo family, and therefore it would be an eternal shame if even one of the entrenchments were lost. Not one was lost. Again and again a.s.saults were delivered, but they were unsuccessful, and throughout the whole of the Kwanto, Nira-yama alone remained flying the Hojo flag to the end. Ujinori surrendered in obedience to Ujimasa's instructions after the fall of Odawara, but Hideyos.h.i.+, instead of punis.h.i.+ng him for the heavy losses he had inflicted on the Osaka army, lauded his fidelity and bravery, and presented him with an estate of ten thousand koku.
DATE MASAMUNE
When news reached Date Masamune of the fall of all the Hojo's outlying forts and of the final investment of Odawara, he recognized, from his place in Mutsu and Dewa, that an att.i.tude of aloofness could no longer be maintained with safety. Accordingly, braving considerable danger, he made his way with a small retinue to Odawara and signified his willingness to comply with any terms imposed by Hideyos.h.i.+. Thus, for the first time since the middle of the fifteenth century, the whole of the empire was pacified.
YEDO
It is historically related that, during the siege of Odawara, Hideyos.h.i.+ invited Ieyasu to the former's headquarters on Is.h.i.+gaki Hill, whence an uninterrupted view of the interior of the castle could be had. The Tokugawa baron was then asked whether, if the eight provinces of the Kwanto were handed over to him, he would choose Odawara for central stronghold. He replied in the affirmative.
Hideyos.h.i.+ pointed out the superior advantages of Yedo from a strategical and commercial point of view, and ultimately when he conferred the Kwanto on Ieyasu, he chose Yedo for the latter's capital, the accompanying revenue being about two and a half million koku. Hideyos.h.i.+ further proposed to appoint Oda n.o.bukatsu to the lords.h.i.+p of the five provinces which had hitherto const.i.tuted the domain of Ieyasu, namely, Suruga, Totomi, Mikawa, Kai, and s.h.i.+nano.
n.o.bukatsu, however, alleging that he did not desire any large domain, asked to be allowed to retain his old estates in Owari and Ise.
This att.i.tude angered Hideyos.h.i.+ for reasons which will presently be apparent. He a.s.signed to n.o.bukatsu a comparatively insignificant fief at Akita, in the remote province of Dewa, and gave the estates in Owari and Ise to Hidetsugu, the nephew and adopted successor of Hideyos.h.i.+, while the five provinces. .h.i.therto under the sway of Ieyasu were divided among Hideyos.h.i.+'s generals and retainers. In September, 1590, Ieyasu entered Yedo, and subdivided his extensive domain among his followers in order of merit, thus establis.h.i.+ng the Tokugawa system of hereditary daimyo and founding a new Bakufu. All this was very significant. In such matters, Hideyos.h.i.+ had repeatedly shown himself to be a man of great magnanimity, and had allowed even his enemies to retain possession of lands which would certainly have been taken from them by other conquerors. Thus, in the case of the Mori sept, fully half of the midland counties was left in their occupation, and, in the case of the s.h.i.+mazu family, they were suffered to retain two and a half provinces.
With regard to Ieyasu, however, Hideyos.h.i.+ behaved with marked caution. By granting to the Tokugawa chieftain the whole of the Kwanto, Hideyos.h.i.+ made it appear as though he were conferring a signal favour; but in reality his object was to remove Ieyasu out of the zone of potential danger to Kyoto. Ieyasu fully recognized this manoeuvre, but bowed to it as the less of two evils. As a further measure of precaution, Hideyos.h.i.+ interposed one of his own family, Hidetsugu, between the Kwanto and Kyoto, and with the object of menacing the rear of Ieyasu and restraining the movements of the Date, he placed Gamo Ujisato at Aizu in Oshu. He further posted Is.h.i.+da Katsus.h.i.+ge at Sawa-yama (now called Hikone) in the province of Omi, to cover the princ.i.p.al route to Kyoto, and for similar reasons with regard to the Yamato and Tamba roads he a.s.signed to his brother, Hidenaga, the castle of Kori-yama, which commanded Izumi and Kii, and to his adopted son, Hidekatsu, the castle at f.u.kuchi-yama in Tamba.
This plan of distributing their domains, so that the daimyo should be mutually repressive, was followed with still greater care by Ieyasu when he, in turn, became supreme.
HIDEYOs.h.i.+ AND BUDDHISM
There are evidences that, from his childhood, Hideyos.h.i.+ had little reverence for the Buddhist faith. When only twelve years of age he is said to have beaten and smashed an image of Amida because it remained always insensible to the offerings of food placed daily before it.
Again, when on his way to Kyoto to avenge the a.s.sa.s.sination of n.o.bunaga, he saw an idol floating on a stream, and seizing the effigy he cut it into two pieces, saying that the deity Daikoku, having competence to succour one thousand persons only, could be of little use to him at such a crisis as he was now required to meet. Finally, on the occasion of his expedition against the Hojo of Odawara, when the sailors of Mis.h.i.+ma, in Sagami, objected to carrying war-horses in their boats on the plea that the G.o.d of the sea, Ryujin, hated everything equine, Hideyos.h.i.+ did not hesitate to remove these scruples by addressing a despatch to the deity with orders to watch over the safety of the steeds.
Yet this same Hideyos.h.i.+ evidently recognized that the Buddhist faith had great potentialities in j.a.pan, and that its encouragement made for the peace and progress of the country. Buddhism suffered terribly at the hands of n.o.bunaga. The great monastery of Enryaku-ji was a ma.s.s of blackened ruins at the time of the Oda baron's death, and it has been shown that the monasteries of Kii and Osaka fared almost equally badly at the hands of Hideyos.h.i.+. Nevertheless the latter had no sooner grasped the supreme administrative power than he showed himself a protector and promotor of Buddhism. Scattered throughout the empire and apparently crippled for all time, the monks of Hiei-zan very soon gave evidence of the vitality of their faith by commencing a vigorous propaganda for the restoration of the great monastery. Many renowned priests, as Zenso, Gosei, and others, headed this movement; Prince Takatomo, adopted son of the Emperor Okimachi, agreed to become lord-abbot of the sect (Tendai), and the Imperial Court issued a proclamation exhorting the people to subscribe for the pious purpose. Hideyos.h.i.+, Ieyasu, and other great barons addressed their va.s.sals in a similar sense, and in Hideyos.h.i.+'s proclamation the imperative necessity of Enryaku-ji as a barrier at the ”Demon's Gate”
was distinctly stated. Under such auspices the monastery quickly rose from its ashes, though in point of size and magnificence it was inferior to its predecessor. At the same time Hideyos.h.i.+ steadily pursued the policy of checking the military tendencies of the monks, and it may be said that, from his era, the soldier-priest ceased to be a factor in the political situation.
THE KYOTO DAIBUTSU
The erection of a colossal image of the Buddha at Nara, in the eighth century, and at Kamakura, in the thirteenth century, marked the consummation of great political programmes in which religious influence acted a strong part. Hideyos.h.i.+ determined to set up a still more imposing effigy in Kyoto, and, in 1586, the work was commenced under the superintendence of Maeda Gen-i. All the princ.i.p.al idol-makers were summoned to the capital, and among them were said to have been some Chinese experts. Hideyos.h.i.+ declared that whereas the Nara Daibutsu had taken twenty-seven years to build, the Kyoto image should be finished in five. He kept his word. No less than twenty-one provinces were placed under requisition for labour and materials. The enclosure of the temple containing the image measured 260 yards by 274, and the great hall had dimensions of 110 yards by 74.
The original intention had been to make the idol of copper; but as the statue was to have a height of 160 feet, the quant.i.ty of metal required could not have been obtained within the time fixed, and lacquered wood was therefore subst.i.tuted for copper. It is related that timbers of sufficient scantling could not be found anywhere except in the forests at the base of Fuji-yama, and Ieyasu employed fifty thousand labourers at a cost of a one thousand ryo in gold, for the purpose of felling the trees and transporting them to Kyoto. The operations furnished evidence of the curiously arbitrary methods practised officially in that age. Thus, when the building was interrupted owing to a lack of large stones for constructing the pedestal, messengers were sent to appropriate rocks standing in private gardens, without consulting the convenience of the owners, and many beautiful parks were thus deprived of their most picturesque elements. Moreover, on the plea of obtaining iron to make nails, clamps, and so forth, a proclamation was issued calling upon the civilian section of the population at large to throw their swords, their spears, their muskets, and their armour into the melting-pot.