Part 4 (1/2)
The lack of preparation in the matter of machine guns has received wide publicity. In this, as in artillery, the deficiency was made good by the Allies up to the final weeks of the war. In April, 1917, the army possessed only a small number of machine guns entirely inadequate even for the training of the new troops and half of which would not take American service cartridges. Less than seven hundred machine rifles were on hand. Manufacturing facilities for machine guns were limited; there were only two factories in the United States actually producing in quant.i.ty. Orders for four thousand Vickers had been placed the preceding December, but deliveries had not been made by the beginning of April.
Either because of jealousy in the department, or because of justifiable technical reasons, various experts demanded a better machine gun than any used by the Allies, and Secretary Baker took the responsibility of delaying matters so as to hold the compet.i.tion recommended by a board of investigation. This compet.i.tion was planned for May 1, 1917, with the result that we entered the war without having decided upon any type of machine gun, and it was not until some weeks later that the Browning was approved.
First deliveries of this gun could not be made until April, 1918, a year after the declaration of war. In the meantime, the War Department utilized existing facilities to the limit, and placed large orders for Colt, Lewis, and Vickers machine guns. But the heavy machine guns and automatic rifles used by our troops in the field were furnished by the French and the British until May, 1918. During that month and June the eleven American divisions that sailed were provided with American-made Vickers, although they still used the French-made Chauchat automatic rifles. After June, all American troops to sail received a full equipment of Brownings, both heavy machine guns and automatic rifles. Altogether 27,000 heavy Brownings and 29,000 light Brownings were s.h.i.+pped to the American Expeditionary Force, sufficient by the time of the armistice to equip completely all the American troops in France. They were not used in combat until the Meuse-Argonne battle, where they amply justified the faith of General Pers.h.i.+ng.
The policy of delaying production in order to obtain the best quality was not followed in the case of the rifle, and the results unquestionably justified the plan, ultimately adopted, of accepting a slightly inferior type which could be produced at once in quant.i.ty. The American army rifle, the Springfield, was generally regarded as the most accurate the world had seen. Unfortunately there was little hope of expanding the production of Springfields sufficiently to meet the necessities of the new National Army. For several years previous to 1917 the Government, with myopic vision, had cut down expenditures for the manufacture of small-arms and ammunition, with the result that artisans skilled in making Springfields had been scattered. Even if the two factories that had been turning out Springfields could be restaffed, their combined production would be insufficient. Private plants could not be utilized for early quant.i.ty production, because of the time that would be taken in building up an adequate manufacturing equipment and training the artisans. Fortune intervened. It happened that three large American firms were about to complete important contracts for supplying Enfield rifles to the British Government. Their plants and skilled labor might be turned to account, but the Enfield was not regarded as satisfactory, princ.i.p.ally because its ammunition was inferior to that taken by the Springfield. The War Department decided to attempt a change in the bore of the Enfield so that it would use Springfield cartridges, and to make other minor simplifications and improvements. The experiment proved successful to the highest degree. The modified Enfields were reported to be only slightly inferior to the Springfields and by the end of December, 1917, five thousand a day were being turned out. Altogether American manufactories produced during the war about two and a half million rifles, of which all but three hundred thousand were modified Enfields.
In the matter of airplane production the record is far less satisfactory.
It is, perhaps, too early to distribute with justice the blame for the delays in production, and full cognizance should be taken of the difficulties which had to be overcome. But whatever explanations are to be found, it is an undeniable fact that not until August, 1918, three months before the armistice, was an American squadron equipped with American planes. The Allies had looked to America for the production of combat planes in quant.i.ty and Congress, responding to popular enthusiasm, had in the first days of the war appropriated more than half a billion dollars for their manufacture. An Aircraft Production Board was organized, with Howard E. Coffin as chairman, although the actual manufacture of the machines was under the supervision of the Signal Corps. Promises were made that by the spring of 1918 the Germans would be completely at the mercy of American airmen.
But difficulties developed. A new type of motor had to be produced, capable of serving in any kind of airplane; this was rapidly and successfully accomplished, and in July, 1917, the Liberty Motor was approved. But just as manufacturing was about to begin changes in the design were demanded, with ensuing delays. There was confusion between the jurisdiction of the Aircraft Board and that of the Signal Corps. The organization of the latter was less efficient than had been expected, and men who knew little or nothing of the technique of aircraft were placed in charge of production. When orders were given for planes to be constructed in France, seven thousand American machinists had to be sent over to release the French machinists who were to work on these contracts, with consequent delays to American production. Repeated alterations in the designs of airplanes must be made to meet changing requirements sent from the front, and large numbers of planes almost ready for delivery had to be sc.r.a.pped. Two of the types manufactured proved to be unsatisfactory and were condemned, with an estimated loss of twenty-six million dollars. Finally the bitter cold of the winter made it difficult to secure the indispensable spruce from the northwestern forests, and lumbering operations were hampered by extensive strikes, which were said to have resulted from German intrigues.
General disappointment at the failure to produce airplanes in quant.i.ty by the spring of 1918 was the more bitter because of the high hopes that had been aroused by those in authority. Instead of confessing the serious nature of the delays, the War Department attempted to conceal not merely the mistakes made but the fact that airplanes could not possibly reach France in any numbers before the autumn of 1918. Thus when at last, in February, a single combat plane was completed and s.h.i.+pped, the War Department issued the statement: ”The first American-built battle planes are to-day _en route_ to France. This first s.h.i.+pment, although not in itself large, marks the final overcoming of many difficulties met in building up a new and intricate industry.” When General Wood returned from France in March and reported that not one American-built plane was in action there, and when the Senate investigation committee unearthed the existence of all the delays, the disillusioned public gave vent to fierce criticism. It was to some extent calmed by the appointment, in April, of John D. Ryan, of the Anaconda Copper Company, as director of aircraft production for the army. By this time many of the most serious difficulties had been pa.s.sed. When the armistice was signed about twelve thousand airplanes had been produced by American plants, of which a third were service-planes.[6]
[Footnote 6: Ayres. _The War with Germany_, 87-90.]
It is impossible here to trace the activities of the various departments in the herculean task of arming the nation. But one should not forget that there was much which never received wide publicity. The development of ordnance carried with it the manufacture of quant.i.ties of ammunition hitherto undreamt of, the building of railway and motorized artillery, the improvement of sight and fire-control apparatus, the making of all sorts of trench-warfare _materiel_. The Air Service had to concern itself with the manufacture of radio telephones, armament for airplanes, the synchronizing of machine guns to fire through propeller blades, airplane bombs, air photography, and pyrotechnics. The Chemical Warfare Service was busy with the making of toxic gases and gas defense equipment, using the peach stones and cocoanut sh.e.l.ls which every one was asked to save.
The enormous quant.i.ties of medical and dental supplies must be gathered by the Quartermaster Department, which also had charge of the salvage service and the thousand gargantuan household occupations, such as laundering and incineration of garbage, that went with the maintenance of the army in camp. The Signal Corps must produce wire, telegraphs, telephones, switchboards, radio equipment, batteries, field gla.s.ses, photographic outfits, and carrier pigeons.
Upon its navy the United States has always relied chiefly for defense and in this branch of the service the country was better prepared for war in 1917 than in the army. Indeed when the nation entered the struggle many persons believed that the sole practical fighting a.s.sistance the United States should give the Allies would be upon the sea. Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, was a Southern politician, of limited administrative experience and capacity. During the first years of his appointment he had alienated navy officers through the introduction of pet reforms and his frank advocacy of a little navy. Resiliency, however, was one of his characteristics and he followed President Wilson in 1916, when the latter demanded from Congress authority for an expansion in the navy which seemed only prudent in view of international conditions.
Largely owing to the efforts of the a.s.sistant Secretary, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the months immediately preceding the declaration of war witnessed strenuous preparations to render aid to the Allies in case the United States should partic.i.p.ate. Thereafter Secretary Daniels tended to sink his personality and judgment in the conduct of the naval war and to defer to the opinion of various officers, of whom Admiral William S.
Benson, Chief of Naval Operations was the most influential. When war was declared two flotillas of destroyers were at once sent to Queenstown to a.s.sist in chasing and sinking submarines, and were placed under the command of Admiral William S. Sims. Battles.h.i.+ps and cruisers followed, though by no means with the expedition nor in the numbers desired by Sims, who believed that by using practically the entire naval force at once the submarine could be exterminated and the war ended.
At home, the Navy Department entered upon a process of expansion which increased its personnel from 65,000 to 497,000 when the armistice was signed. A rapid development in naval construction was planned, with emphasis upon destroyers. The effects of this programme became visible within a year; during the first nine months of 1918 no less than eighty-three destroyers were launched, as against sixty-two for the preceding nine years. Submarine chasers of a special design were built and many private yachts taken over and adapted to the war against the submarine. During the course of the war two battles.h.i.+ps and twenty-eight submarines were completed. Expansion in naval s.h.i.+pbuilding plans was paralleled by the construction of giant docks; by camps sufficient for the training of two hundred thousand men; and by a naval aircraft factory from which a seaplane was turned out seven months after work on the factory was begun. Naval aviators returning from the Channel coasts superintended flying schools and undertook the patrol of our Atlantic seaboard.
If much of these military preparations was not translated into accomplishment before the war ended, it was because the United States was preparing wisely for a long struggle and it seemed necessary that the foundations should be broad and deep. ”America was straining her energies towards a goal,” said the Director of Munitions, ”toward the realization of an ambition which, in the production of munitions, dropped the year 1918 almost out of consideration altogether, which indeed did not bring the full weight of American men and _materiel_ into the struggle even in 1919, but which left it for 1920, if the enemy had not yet succ.u.mbed to the growing American power, to witness the maximum strength of the United States in the field.” It was the knowledge of this preparation which, to some extent, helped to convince the German General Staff of the futility of further resistance and thus to bring the war to an early end.
The dependence of the United States upon the Allies for equipment and munitions does not deserve the vitriolic anathemas of certain critics.
The country did not enter the struggle as if it expected to fight the war single-handed. Distribution of labor and supplies between the United States and the Allies was merely a wise and economic measure. At their own request, the Allies were furnished with that which they most needed--money, food, and man-power. In return they provided the United States with the artillery and machine guns which they could spare and which they could manufacture more cheaply and rapidly. Finally there is the outstanding fact, of which America may always be proud, that this heterogeneous democracy, organized, so far as organization existed, for the pursuits of peace, was able in the s.p.a.ce of sixteen months, to provide an army capable of fighting successfully one of the most difficult campaigns of the war, and that which led directly to the military defeat of Germany.
The ultimate success of President Wilson's war policies could hardly have been achieved except by the process of centralization which he never lost from view. His insistence upon centralized responsibility and control in political matters was paralleled in the military field. Nothing ill.u.s.trates this principle better than the centralization of the American Expeditionary Force under the absolute and unquestioned command of General Pers.h.i.+ng. The latter was given free rein. The jealousies which so weakened the Union armies during the first years of the Civil War were ruthlessly repressed. No generals were sent to France of whom he did not approve.
When the Allies threatened to appeal to Was.h.i.+ngton over Pers.h.i.+ng's head, President Wilson turned a deaf ear.
In the United States, the President sought similar centralization through the General Staff. It was this body which prepared the different plans for the Draft Act, the Pers.h.i.+ng expedition, and finally for the gigantic task of putting a million men in France by the summer of 1918. To the staff was given the formulation of the training programme along the lines recommended by Pers.h.i.+ng. Always, however, it was hampered by the multiple responsibility that characterized the old-style army machine with its bureau chiefs competing with each other, with the navy, and with the Allies. Quartermaster Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and the other bureaus were uncoordinated, and inevitable waste and inefficiency followed all their operations. It was the crisis that arose from the problem of supplies, in the winter of 1917, that furnished the President with the opportunity to cut red-tape and secure the centralization he desired. That opportunity came with the blanket powers bestowed upon him by the Overman Act, the full significance of which can only be appreciated after a consideration of the measures taken to centralize the industrial resources of the nation.
CHAPTER VII
THE HOME FRONT
On May 18, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation in which are to be found the following significant sentences:
In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. Thus, the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war--it is a Nation. To this end our people must draw close in one compact front against a common foe. But this cannot be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose. The Nation needs all men, but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a trip-hammer for the forging of great guns, and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, the Nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his levers. The whole Nation must be a team, in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted.
If President Wilson deserves severe criticism for his failure to endorse adequate plans of preparation for war while his country was at peace, he should be given due credit for his appreciation that the home front must be organized if the fighting front was to be victorious. He perceived clearly that it was necessary to carry into the industrial life of the nation that centralizing process which characterized his military policy.
That the nation at home was made to feel itself part of the fighting forces and cooperated enthusiastically and effectively in the organization of the national resources was not the least of the triumphs of the United States. Such organization demanded great sacrifice, not merely of luxuries or comforts, but of settled habits, which are difficult to break. It must necessarily be of an emergency character, for the United States possessed no bureaucratic system like that which obtains on the continent of Europe for the centralization of trade, manufactures, food production, and the thousand activities that form part of economic life. But the event proved that both the spirit and the brains of the American people were equal to the crisis.
The problem of coordinating the national industries for the supply of the army was complicated by the military decentralization described in the preceding chapter, which President Wilson was not able to remedy before the final months of the war. The army did not form or state its requirements as one body but through five supply bureaus, which acted independently and in compet.i.tion with each other. Bids for materials from the different bureaus conflicted with each other, with those of the navy, and of the Allies. Not merely was it essential that such demands should be coordinated, but that some central committee should be able to say how large was the total supply of any sort of materials, how soon they could be produced, and to prevent the waste of such materials in unessential production. If the army was decentralized, American industry as a whole was in a state of complete chaos, so far as any central organization was concerned. On the side of business every firm in every line of production was competing in the manufacture of essential and unessential articles, in transportation, and in bidding for and holding the necessary labor.
Mr. Wilson set himself the task of evolving order out of this chaos.