Part 27 (1/2)
I
B.C. 369. In the following year (1) plenipotentiary amba.s.sadors (2) from the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of absolute equality, (3) ”share and share alike,” when Procles of Phlius put forward the following argument:
(1) I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, ”Chron.
Table” 95, note 215; see Grote, ”H. G.” x. 346, note 1.
(2) See Hicks, 89.
(3) For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying ”share and share alike,” see Thuc. i. 145, etc.
”Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to secure the friends.h.i.+p of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me, which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friends.h.i.+p may be made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity, but there remains the question of leaders.h.i.+p. The preliminary decree of your senate antic.i.p.ates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom the sea is important are ma.s.sed round your own, and all of these are inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours and roadsteads, without which it is not possible to turn a naval power to account.
Again, you have many s.h.i.+ps of war. To extend your naval empire is a traditional policy; all the arts and sciences connected with these matters you possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from the sea, or things connected with it; so that in the very act of minding your own affairs you are training yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat.
(4) Again, no other power in the world can send out a larger collective fleet, and that is no insignificant point in reference to the question of leaders.h.i.+p. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes a rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this department must be looked upon as a definite gift of G.o.d: for, consider among the numberless great sea-fights which you have fought how few you have lost, how many you have won. It is only rational, then, that your allies should much prefer to share this particular risk with you. Indeed, to show you how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedaemonians, when at war with you in old days, dominated your territory, but they made no progress towards destroying you. At last G.o.d granted them one day to push forward their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant you completely succ.u.mbed to them. (5) Is it not self-evident that your safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your natural element--your birthright; it would be base indeed to entrust the hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they themselves admit, they are far less acquainted with this business than yourselves; and, secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for equal stakes--theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their s.h.i.+ps, but yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire state.
(4) See ”Pol. Ath.” i. 19 foll.
(5) See ”h.e.l.l.” II. i.
”And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, now, and consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first point to notice is, that they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it does not matter how much they are cut off from the sea--they can carry on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier's life. The keystone of this training is obedience to command, (6) and in this they hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that their allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with undying courage. (7) Further, G.o.d has granted them to enjoy on land a like good fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many contests they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in how many they have been successful. The same unflagging attention which you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, and, as the facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable to them. Thus, although you were at war with them for several years and gained many a naval victory over them, you never advanced a step nearer to reducing them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they were confronted with a danger affecting the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the interests of the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrendering to others the military leaders.h.i.+p on land, in matters which they have made their special study for so long and with such eminent success. I end where I began. I agree absolutely with the preliminary decrees of your own senate, which I consider the solution most advantageous to both parties. My prayer (8) is that you may be guided in your deliberations to that conclusion which is best for each and all of us.”
(6) Or, ”the spirit of discipline.” See ”Mem.” III. v. 16; IV. iv. 15; Thuc. ii. 39; ”Pol. Lac.” viii.
(7) Or, ”with unlimited confidence.”
(8) See above, ”h.e.l.l.” VI. i. 13, {kai su prattois ta kratista}, ”and so may the best fortune attend you!”--if that reading and rendering be adopted.
Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of his speech were vehemently applauded by the Athenians no less than by the Lacedaemonians who were present. Then Cephisodotus (9) stepped forward and addressed the a.s.sembly. He said, ”Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it to you in a moment.
There is no doubt about your leaders.h.i.+p by sea: it is already secured.
But suppose the Lacedaemonians in alliance with you: it is plain they will send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of Laconian breed; but who will the sailors be? Helots obviously, or mercenaries of some sort. These are the folk over whom you will exercise your leaders.h.i.+p. Reverse the case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general order summoning you to join them in the field; it is plain again, you will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. You see what follows. You have invented a pretty machine, by which they become leaders of your very selves, and you become the leaders either of their slaves or of the dregs of their state. I should like to put a question to the Lacedaemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just now, Sir, that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality, 'share and share alike'? Answer me.” ”I did say so.” ”Well, then, here is a plan by which you get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive of anything more fair and impartial than that 'turn and turn about' each of us should command the navy, each the army; whereby whatever advantage there may be in maritime or military command we may each of us share.”
(9) See above, ”h.e.l.l.” VI. iii. 2; Hicks, 87.
These arguments were successful. The Athenians were converted, and pa.s.sed a decree vesting the command in either state (10) for periods of five days alternately.
(10) See ”Revenues,” v. 7.
B.C. 369. (11) The campaign was commenced by both Athenians and Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon Corinth, where it was resolved to keep watch and ward over Oneion jointly. On the advance of the Thebans and their allies the troops were drawn out to defend the pa.s.s. They were posted in detachments at different points, the most a.s.sailable of which was a.s.signed to the Lacedaemonians and the men of Pellene. (12)
(11) See Grote, ”H. G.” x. 349 foll.; al. B.C. 368.
(12) ”During the wars of Epameinondas Pellene adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when other cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause.”--Freeman, ”Hist. Fed.
Gov.” p. 241. Afterwards Pellene is found temporarily on the Theban side (”h.e.l.l.” VII. ii. 11).
The Thebans and their allies, finding themselves within three or four miles (13) of the troops guarding the pa.s.s, encamped in the flat ground below; but presently, after a careful calculation of the time it would take to start and reach the goal in the gloaming, they advanced against the Lacedaemonian outposts. In spite of the difficulty they timed their movements to a nicety, and fell upon the Lacedaemonians and Pellenians just at the interval when the night pickets were turning in and the men were leaving their shakedowns and retiring for necessary purposes. (14) This was the instant for the Thebans to fling themselves upon them; they plied their weapons with good effect, blow upon blow. Order was pitted against disorder, preparation against disarray. When, however, those who escaped from the thick of the business had retired to the nearest rising ground, the Lacedaemonian polemarch, who might have taken as many heavy, or light, infantry of the allies as he wanted, and thus have held the position (no bad one, since it enabled him to get his supplies safely enough from Cenchreae), failed to do so. On the contrary, and in spite of the great perplexity of the Thebans as to how they were to get down from the high level facing Sicyon or else retire the way they came, the Spartan general made a truce, which in the opinion of the majority, seemed more in favour of the Thebans than himself, and so he withdrew his division and fell back.
(13) Lit. ”thirty stades.”
(14) Or, ”intent on their personal concerns.” See ”h.e.l.l.” II. iv. 6; ”Hipparch.” vii. 12.
The Thebans were now free to descend without hindrance, which they did; and, effecting a junction with their allies the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians, at once attacked (15) Sicyon and Pellene, and, marching on Epidaurus, laid waste the whole territory of that people. Returning from that exploit with a consummate disdain for all their opponents, when they found themselves near the city of Corinth they advanced at the double against the gate facing towards Phlius; intending if they found it open to rush in. However, a body of light troops sallied out of the city to the rescue, and met the advance of the Theban picked corps (16) not one hundred and fifty yards (17) from the walls. Mounting on the monuments and commanding eminences, with volleys of sling stones and arrows they laid low a pretty large number in the van of the attack, and routing them, gave chase for three or four furlongs' (18) distance.