Part 12 (1/2)
(3) Besides the general question whether volitions are determined, there is the further question whether they are _mechanically_ determined, i.e. whether they are part of what was above defined as a mechanical system. This is the question whether they form part of a system with purely material determinants, i.e. whether there are laws which, given certain material data, make all volitions functions of those data. Here again, there is empirical evidence up to a point, but it is not conclusive in regard to all volitions. It is important to observe, however that even if volitions are part of a mechanical system, this by no means implies any supremacy of matter over mind. It may well be that the same system which is susceptible of material determinants is also susceptible of mental determinants; thus a mechanical system may be determined by sets of volitions, as well as by sets of material facts. It would seem, therefore, that the reasons which make people dislike the view that volitions are mechanically determined are fallacious.
(4) The notion of _necessity_, which is often a.s.sociated with determinism, is a confused notion not legitimately deducible from determinism. Three meanings are commonly confounded when necessity is spoken of:--
(a) An _action_ is necessary when it will be performed however much the agent may wish to do otherwise. Determinism does not imply that actions are necessary in this sense.
() A _propositional function_ is necessary when all its values are true. This sense is not relevant to our present discussion.
(?) A _proposition_ is necessary with respect to a given const.i.tuent when it is the value, with that const.i.tuent as argument, of a necessary propositional function, in other words, when it remains true however that const.i.tuent may be varied. In this sense, in a deterministic system, the connection of a volition with its determinants is necessary, if the time at which the determinants occur be taken as the const.i.tuent to be varied, the time-interval between the determinants and the volition being kept constant. But this sense of necessity is purely logical, and has no emotional importance.
We may now sum up our discussion of causality. We found first that the law of causality, as usually stated by philosophers, is false, and is not employed in science. We then considered the nature of scientific laws, and found that, instead of stating that one event A is always followed by another event B, they stated functional relations between certain events at certain times, which we called determinants, and other events at earlier or later times or at the same time. We were unable to find any _a priori_ category involved: the existence of scientific laws appeared as a purely empirical fact, not necessarily universal, except in a trivial and scientifically useless form. We found that a system with one set of determinants may very likely have other sets of a quite different kind, that, for example, a mechanically determined system may also be teleologically or volitionally determined. Finally we considered the problem of free will: here we found that the reasons for supposing volitions to be determined are strong but not conclusive, and we decided that even if volitions are mechanically determined, that is no reason for denying freedom in the sense revealed by introspection, or for supposing that mechanical events are not determined by volitions. The problem of free will _versus_ determinism is therefore, if we were right, mainly illusory, but in part not yet capable of being decisively solved.
FOOTNOTES:
[35] A propositional function is an expression containing a variable, or undetermined const.i.tuent, and becoming a proposition as soon as a definite value is a.s.signed to the variable. Examples are: ”A is A,”
”_x_ is a number.” The variable is called the _argument_ of the function.
[36] _Logic_, Bk. III, Chap. V, -- 2.
[37] _Time and Free Will_, p. 199.
[38] _Time and Free Will._ p. 202.
[39] _Loc. cit._, -- 6
X
KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
The object of the following paper is to consider what it is that we know in cases where we know propositions about ”the so-and-so” without knowing who or what the so-and-so is. For example, I know that the candidate who gets most votes will be elected, though I do not know who is the candidate who will get most votes. The problem I wish to consider is: What do we know in these cases, where the subject is merely described? I have considered this problem elsewhere[40] from a purely logical point of view; but in what follows I wish to consider the question in relation to theory of knowledge as well as in relation to logic, and in view of the above-mentioned logical discussions, I shall in this paper make the logical portion as brief as possible.
In order to make clear the ant.i.thesis between ”acquaintance” and ”description,” I shall first of all try to explain what I mean by ”acquaintance.” I say that I am _acquainted_ with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which const.i.tutes judgment, but the sort which const.i.tutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which const.i.tutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S.
But the a.s.sociations and natural extensions of the word _acquaintance_ are different from those of the word _presentation_. To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2=4 even when I am thinking of something else. In the second place, the word _acquaintance_ is designed to emphasise, more than the word _presentation_, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentation, we may so emphasise the object as to lose sight of the subject. The result of this is either to lead to the view that there is no subject, whence we arrive at materialism; or to lead to the view that what is presented is part of the subject, whence we arrive at idealism, and should arrive at solipsism but for the most desperate contortions. Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a fundamental fact concerning cognition. Hence I prefer the word _acquaintance_ because it emphasises the need of a subject which is acquainted.
When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is _sense-data_. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. The sense-datum with which I am acquainted in these cases is generally, if not always, complex. This is particularly obvious in the case of sight. I do not mean, of course, merely that the supposed physical object is complex, but that the direct sensible object is complex and contains parts with spatial relations. Whether it is possible to be aware of a complex without being aware of its const.i.tuents is not an easy question, but on the whole it would seem that there is no reason why it should not be possible. This question arises in an acute form in connection with self-consciousness, which we must now briefly consider.
In introspection, we seem to be immediately aware of varying complexes, consisting of objects in various cognitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun; and when I desire food, it often happens that I am aware of my desire for food. But it is hard to discover any state of mind in which I am aware of myself alone, as opposed to a complex of which I am a const.i.tuent. The question of the nature of self-consciousness is too large and too slightly connected with our subject, to be argued at length here. It is difficult, but probably not impossible, to account for plain facts if we a.s.sume that we do not have acquaintance with ourselves. It is plain that we are not only _acquainted_ with the complex ”Self-acquainted-with-A,” but we also _know_ the proposition ”I am acquainted with A.” Now here the complex has been a.n.a.lysed, and if ”I” does not stand for something which is a direct object of acquaintance, we shall have to suppose that ”I” is something known by description. If we wished to maintain the view that there is no acquaintance with Self, we might argue as follows: We are acquainted with _acquaintance_, and we know that it is a relation. Also we are acquainted with a complex in which we perceive that acquaintance is the relating relation. Hence we know that this complex must have a const.i.tuent which is that which is acquainted, i.e. must have a subject-term as well as an object-term. This subject-term we define as ”I.” Thus ”I” means ”the subject-term in awarenesses of which _I_ am aware.” But as a definition this cannot be regarded as a happy effort. It would seem necessary, therefore, either to suppose that I am acquainted with myself, and that ”I,” therefore, requires no definition, being merely the proper name of a certain object, or to find some other a.n.a.lysis of self-consciousness. Thus self-consciousness cannot be regarded as throwing light on the question whether we can know a complex without knowing its const.i.tuents. This question, however, is not important for our present purposes, and I shall therefore not discuss it further.
The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all in a large sense be called sense-data. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be called awareness of _particulars_; we have also (though not quite in the same sense) what may be called awareness of _universals_. Awareness of universals is called _conceiving_, and a universal of which we are aware is called a _concept_. Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal _yellow_; this universal is the subject in such judgments as ”yellow differs from blue” or ”yellow resembles blue less than green does.” And the universal yellow is the predicate in such judgments as ”this is yellow,” where ”this” is a particular sense-datum. And universal relations, too, are objects of awarenesses; up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, awareness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we can be aware.
In regard to relations, it might be urged that we are never aware of the universal relation itself, but only of complexes in which it is a const.i.tuent. For example, it may be said that we do not know directly such a relation as _before_, though we understand such a proposition as ”this is before that,” and may be directly aware of such a complex as ”this being before that.” This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that we often know propositions in which the relation is the subject, or in which the relata are not definite given objects, but ”anything.” For example, we know that if one thing is before another, and the other before a third, then the first is before the third; and here the things concerned are not definite things, but ”anything.” It is hard to see how we could know such a fact about ”before” unless we were acquainted with ”before,” and not merely with actual particular cases of one given object being before another given object. And more directly: A judgment such as ”this is before that,”
where this judgment is derived from awareness of a complex, const.i.tutes an a.n.a.lysis, and we should not understand the a.n.a.lysis if we were not acquainted with the meaning of the terms employed. Thus we must suppose that we are acquainted with the meaning of ”before,” and not merely with instances of it.
There are thus at least two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, and all complexes of which one or more const.i.tuents are existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-yellowness-of-this. Among universals I include all objects of which no particular is a const.i.tuent. Thus the disjunction ”universal-particular” includes all objects. We might also call it the disjunction ”abstract-concrete.” It is not quite parallel with the opposition ”concept-percept,” because things remembered or imagined belong with particulars, but can hardly be called percepts. (On the other hand, universals with which we are acquainted may be identified with concepts.)
It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other people's minds. These things are known to us by what I call ”knowledge by description,” which we must now consider.
By a ”description” I mean any phrase of the form ”a so-and-so” or ”the so-and-so.” A phrase of the form ”a so-and-so” I shall call an ”ambiguous” description; a phrase of the form ”the so-and-so” (in the singular) I shall call a ”definite” description. Thus ”a man” is an ambiguous description, and ”the man with the iron mask” is a definite description. There are various problems connected with ambiguous descriptions, but I pa.s.s them by, since they do not directly concern the matter I wish to discuss. What I wish to discuss is the nature of our knowledge concerning objects in cases where we know that there is an object answering to a definite description, though we are not _acquainted_ with any such object. This is a matter which is concerned exclusively with _definite_ descriptions. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of ”descriptions” when I mean ”definite descriptions.” Thus a description will mean any phrase of the form ”the so-and-so” in the singular.
I shall say that an object is ”known by description” when we know that it is ”_the_ so-and-so,” i.e. when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. We know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions are known about him; but we do not know who he was.
We know that the candidate who gets most votes will be elected, and in this case we are very likely also acquainted (in the only sense in which one can be acquainted with some one else) with the man who is, in fact, the candidate who will get most votes, but we do not know which of the candidates he is, i.e. we do not know any proposition of the form ”A is the candidate who will get most votes” where A is one of the candidates by name. We shall say that we have ”_merely_ descriptive knowledge” of the so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition ”_a_ is the so-and-so,” where _a_ is something with which we are acquainted.
When we say ”the so-and-so exists,” we mean that there is just one object which is the so-and-so. The proposition ”_a_ is the so-and-so”