Part 8 (1/2)
CHAPTER XIII.
WAs.h.i.+NGTON AT VALLEY FORGE. 1777, 1778.
We have already given some details of the sufferings endured by Was.h.i.+ngton and his brave soldiers at Valley Forge. One-half the tale is not told--never will be told; their sufferings were unutterable. A review of this portion of Was.h.i.+ngton's life will show that at Valley Forge not only was a great deal suffered but a great deal was done. Here the army was hardened from the gristle of youth to the bone and muscle of manhood. It entered the tents of that dreary encampment a courageous but disorderly rabble; it left them a disciplined army. But we must not antic.i.p.ate events.
This army, which was under the immediate command of Was.h.i.+ngton, was engaged through the winter (1777-1778) in endeavoring to stop the intercourse between Philadelphia and the country. To effect this object General Smallwood was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel Morgan, who had been detached from Gates's army, was placed on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill, and General Armstrong with the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old camp at White Marsh.
Major Jameson with two troops of cavalry and M'Lane's infantry, was directed to guard the east and Capt. Henry Lee with his troop, the west side of that river. General Count Pulaski, who commanded the horse, led the residue of the cavalry to Trenton, where he trained them for the ensuing campaign.
One of the first operations meditated by Was.h.i.+ngton after crossing the Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quant.i.ty of hay which remained in the islands above the mouth of Darby creek, within the power of the British. Early in the morning, after his orders for this purpose had been given (December 22d), Howe marched out in full force and encamped between Darby and the middle ferry, so as completely to cover the islands while a foraging party removed the hay. Was.h.i.+ngton, with the intention of disturbing this operation, gave orders for putting his army in motion, when the alarming fact was disclosed that the commissary's stores were exhausted and that the last ration had been delivered and consumed.
Accustomed as were the Continental troops to privations of every sort, it would have been hazarding too much to move them under these circ.u.mstances against a powerful enemy. In a desert or in a garrison where food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits of discipline enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinary situations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a country abounding with provisions requires something more than fort.i.tude; nor can soldiers readily submit while in such a country to the deprivation of food. It is not, therefore, surprising that among a few of the troops some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more astonis.h.i.+ng that the great body of the army bore a circ.u.mstance so irritating, and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur.
On receiving intelligence of the fact, Was.h.i.+ngton ordered the country to be scoured and provisions for supplying the pressing wants of the moment to be seized wherever found. In the meantime light parties were detached to hara.s.s the enemy about Darby, where Howe, with his accustomed circ.u.mspection, kept his army so compact and his soldiers so within the lines that an opportunity to annoy him was seldom afforded even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee. After completing his forage he returned, with inconsiderable loss, to Philadelphia.
That the American army, while the value still retained by paper bills placed ample funds in the hands of government, should be dest.i.tute of food in the midst of a State so abounding with provisions as Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which cannot fail to excite attention. A few words of explanation seem to be needed to account for such a fact. Early in the war the office of commissary-general had been conferred on Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman well fitted for that important station. Yet, from the difficulty of arranging so complicated a department, complaints were repeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies. The subject was taken up by Congress, but the remedy administered served only to increase the disease. The system was not completed till near midsummer, and then its arrangements were such that Colonel Trumbull refused the office a.s.signed to him. The new plan contemplated a number of subordinate officers, all to be appointed by Congress, and neither accountable to nor removable by the head of the department. This arrangement, which was made in direct opposition to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from the army. Congress, however, persisted in the system, and its effects were not long in unfolding themselves. In every military division of the continent loud complaints were made of the deficiency of supplies. The armies were greatly embarra.s.sed and their movements suspended by the want of provisions. The present total failure of all supply was preceded by issuing meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject had been made to the Commander-in-Chief and communicated to Congress. That body had authorized him to seize provisions for the use of his army within seventy miles of headquarters and to pay for them in money or in certificates. The odium of this measure was increased by the failure of government to provide funds to take up these certificates when presented. At the same time the provisions carried into Philadelphia were paid for in specie at a fair price. The temptation was too great to be resisted. Such was the dexterity employed by the inhabitants in eluding the laws that notwithstanding the vigilance of the troops stationed on the lines they often succeeded in concealing their provisions from those authorized to impress for the army and in conveying them to Philadelphia. Was.h.i.+ngton, urged on by Congress, issued a proclamation requiring all the farmers within seventy miles of Valley Forge to thresh out one-half of their grain by the 1st of February and the rest by the 1st of March, under the penalty of having the whole seized as straw. Many farmers refused, defended their grain and cattle with muskets and rifle, and, in some instances, burnt what they could not defend.
It would seem that Was.h.i.+ngton had a sufficiently heavy burden upon his shoulders in the hara.s.sing cares and anxieties of his position, and that he might have been spared from trials of another sort to which he was exposed at this time, but Was.h.i.+ngton experienced what every great and good man must expect to meet with in an envious and malicious world.
Thus far, apparently, little else than ill-success had attended the military exploits of the Commander-in-Chief. He had been compelled to retreat continually before a powerful enemy. New York and Philadelphia had been lost, and there was almost nothing of a brilliant or striking character in what had transpired during the war under Was.h.i.+ngton's immediate direction. On the other hand, the victory at Saratoga had thrown a l.u.s.tre around Gates' name which far outshone for the time the solid and enduring light of Was.h.i.+ngton's n.o.ble and patriotic devotion to his country. It was the first great victory of the war and it was a victory which necessarily had a most important effect upon the future prospects of the United States. No wonder, then, that restless and envious men should make invidious comparisons between the hero of Saratoga and the Commander-in-Chief. No wonder that Was.h.i.+ngton should suffer from detraction and the intrigues of dissatisfied and scheming men, to whom his unsullied virtue, purity, and integrity were invincible obstacles to every design of theirs to promote selfish or ambitious ends.
A direct and systematic attempt was made to ruin the reputation of Was.h.i.+ngton, and from the name of the person princ.i.p.ally concerned this attempt is known by the t.i.tle of Conway's Cabal. General Gates and General Mifflin of the army and Samuel Adams and others in Congress had more or less to do with this matter. Gates and Mifflin had taken offense at not receiving certain appointments during the siege of Boston, and were at no time well disposed toward Was.h.i.+ngton; Conway, a restless, boastful, and intriguing character, had always been distrusted by Was.h.i.+ngton, and he knew it. Some of the New England members do not seem ever to have cordially liked Was.h.i.+ngton's appointment as Commander-in-Chief, and now, when the capture of Burgoyne had been effected by the northern army without the intervention of Was.h.i.+ngton the malcontents ventured to a.s.sume a bolder att.i.tude. Anonymous letters were freely circulated, attributing the ill-success of the American arms to the incapacity or vacillating policy of Was.h.i.+ngton and filled with insinuations and exaggerated complaints against the Commander-in-Chief.
[1]
Was.h.i.+ngton was not unaware of what his enemies were attempting, but it was not till after the victory of Saratoga that the matter a.s.sumed a definite shape. The success of the northern army, which in fact was chiefly due to Schuyler, so elated Gates that he seemed to adopt the views of those other members of the cabal who were disposed to favor his aspirations to the office of commander-in-chief. He even ventured to do what few men ever dared, to treat Was.h.i.+ngton with disrespect. After the victory of the 7th of October (1777) had opened to him the prospect of subduing the army of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicate his success to Was.h.i.+ngton, but carried on a correspondence with Conway, in which that officer expressed great contempt for the Commander-in-Chief.
When the purport of this correspondence, which had been divulged by Wilkinson to Lord Stirling, became known to Was.h.i.+ngton, he exploded the whole affair by sending the offensive expressions directly to Conway, who communicated the information to Gates. [1] Gates demanded the name of the informer in a letter to Was.h.i.+ngton, far from being conciliatory in its terms, which was accompanied with the very extraordinary circ.u.mstance of being pa.s.sed through Congress. Was.h.i.+ngton's answer completely humbled him.
It pointed out the inconsistencies and contradictions of Gates' defense and showed him that Was.h.i.+ngton had penetrated his whole scheme and regarded it with lofty contempt. In a subsequent letter Gates besought him to bury the subject in oblivion.
Meantime, Was.h.i.+ngton's enemies in Congress were bold and active. A new Board of War was created, of which Gates was appointed the president, and Mifflin, who was of the party unfriendly to Was.h.i.+ngton, was one of its members. Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the army that had joined this faction, was appointed Inspector-general and was promoted above senior brigadiers to the rank of major-general. These were evidences that if the hold which the Commander-in-Chief had taken of the affections and confidence of the army and nation could be loosened, the party in Congress disposed to change their general was far from being contemptible in point of numbers. But to loosen this hold was impossible. The indignation with which the idea of such a change was received, even by the victorious troops who had conquered under Gates, forms the most conclusive proof of its strength. Even the northern army clung to Was.h.i.+ngton as the savior of his country.
These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of Was.h.i.+ngton made no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of his measures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism, of apprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. [2]
His desire to remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the conviction that his retaining that station would be useful to his country, rather than from the gratification his high rank might furnish to ambition.
When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and sentiments he expressed were worthy of Was.h.i.+ngton. To Mr. Laurens, [3]
the President of Congress, and his private friend, who, in an unofficial letter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to him, as President, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-Chief, he said. ”I cannot sufficiently express the Obligation I feel toward you for your friends.h.i.+p and politeness upon an occasion in which I am deeply interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction had been for some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I am of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trusts reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account; but my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause.
”As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many serious charges and it is my wish that it may be submitted to Congress. This I am the more inclined to as the suppression or concealment may possibly involve you in embarra.s.sment hereafter since it is uncertain how many or who may be privy to the contents.
”My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy of my situation and that motives of policy deprive me of the defense I might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I cannot combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing secrets it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be free from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station? Merit and talents which I cannot pretend to rival have ever been subject to it.
My heart tells me it has been my unremitted aim to do the best which circ.u.mstances would permit. Yet I may have been very often mistaken in my judgment of the means and may in many instances deserve the imputation of error.”
While Was.h.i.+ngton expressed himself in these modest terms to a personal friend, he a.s.sumed a much bolder and higher tone to the dastardly enemies who were continually thwarting his designs and injuring the public service by their malignity and incapacity. These were public enemies to be publicly arraigned. Seizing the occasion to which we have already referred, when the army was unable to march against the enemy for want of provisions, he sent to the President of Congress the following letter which, of course, like the rest of his correspondence, was to be read to the whole house. It is severer than any he had ever written: ”Full as I was in my representation of the matters in the commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons oblige me to add that I am now convinced beyond a doubt that unless some great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line this army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things--to starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest a.s.sured, sir, that this is not an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason to suppose what I say.
”Sat.u.r.day afternoon receiving information that the enemy in force had left the city and were advancing toward Darby with apparent design to forage and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness that I might give every opposition in my power, when, to my great mortification, I was not only informed but convinced that the men were unable to stir on account of a want of provisions, and that a dangerous mutiny begun the night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by the spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want this article.
”This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this camp and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour! From hence form an opinion of our situation when I add that he could not tell when to expect any.