Part 14 (1/2)
Two detachments, amounting each to 1,600 men, were to march from Pittsburgh and Wyoming against Detroit and Niagara. A third body of troops which was to be stationed on the Mohawk during the winter and to be powerfully reinforced in the spring, was to seize Oswego and to secure the navigation of Lake Ontario with vessels to be constructed of materials to be procured in the winter. A fourth corps was to penetrate into Canada by the St. Francis and to reduce Montreal and the posts on Lake Champlain, while a fifth should guard against troops from Quebec.
Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But Upper Canada being reduced another campaign would still be necessary for the reduction of Quebec. This circ.u.mstance would require that the army should pa.s.s the winter in Canada, and in the meantime the garrison of Quebec might be largely reinforced. It was therefore essential to the complete success of the enterprise that France should be induced to take a part in it.
The conquest of Quebec and of Halifax was supposed to be an object of so much importance to France as well as to the United States that her aid might be confidently expected.
It was proposed to request the King of France to furnish four or five thousand troops, to sail from Brest the beginning of May under convoy of four s.h.i.+ps of the line and four frigates, the troops to be clad as if for service in the West Indies and thick clothes to be sent after them in August. A large American detachment was to act with this French army and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifax might be reduced by the beginning or middle of October. The army might then either proceed immediately against New Foundland or remain in garrison until the spring when the conquest of that place might be accomplished.
It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the further prosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in which case the government would have a respectable force at its disposal, the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention of Was.h.i.+ngton. He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts in Upper Canada as a measure which might be eventually eligible and which might employ the arms of the United States to advantage if their troops might safely be withdrawn from the sea-board. He had, however, considered every object of this sort as contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise he had found them so considerable as to hesitate on the extent which might safely be given to the expedition admitting the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.
In this state of mind Was.h.i.+ngton received the magnificent plan already prepared by Congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability of executing that part of it which, was to be undertaken by the United States should the British armies continue in the country and with the serious mischief which would result to the common cause as well as from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising as from the ill impression which would be made on the court and nation by the total failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan originating with itself--a failure would most probably sacrifice the troops and s.h.i.+ps employed by France.
On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in different parts of the world, the former appeared to Was.h.i.+ngton to maintain a decided superiority and consequently to possess the power of shutting up the s.h.i.+ps of the latter which might be trusted into the St. Lawrence.
To suppose that the British government would not avail itself of this superiority on such an occasion would be to impute to it a blind infatuation or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not be safely a.s.sumed in calculations of such serious import.
A plan, too, consisting of so many parts to be prosecuted both from Europe and America by land and by water--which, to be successful, required such an harmonious cooperation of the whole, such a perfect coincidence of events--appeared to him to be exposed to too many accidents to risk upon it interests of such high value.
In a long and serious letter to Congress he apologized for not obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it to Lafayette, and entering into a full investigation of all its parts demonstrated the mischiefs and the dangers with which it was replete.
This letter was referred to a committee whose report admits the force of the reasons urged by Was.h.i.+ngton against the expedition and their own conviction that nothing important could be attempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from the United States and that even in that event the present plan was far too complex.
Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favorite and flattering projects on which they have long meditated, and the committee in their report proceeded to state the opinion that the posts held by the British in the United States would probably be evacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign, and that, therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.
This report concludes with recommending, ”that the general should be directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject, and also write to the minister of these States at the court of Versailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec for co-operating therewith to the utmost degree which the finances and resources of these States will admit.”
This report also was approved by Congress and transmitted to Was.h.i.+ngton who felt himself greatly embarra.s.sed by it. While his objections to the project retained all their force he found himself required to open a correspondence for the purposes of soliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved, and of promising a cooperation he believed to be impracticable. In reply to this communication he said: ”The earnest desire I have strictly to comply in every instance with the views and instructions of Congress cannot but make me feel the greatest uneasiness when I find myself in circ.u.mstances of hesitation or doubt with respect to their directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and candor of that honorable body emboldens me to communicate without reserve the difficulties which occur in the execution of their present order, and the indulgence I have experienced on every former occasion induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will not meet with disapprobation.”
After reviewing the report of the committee and stating his objections to the plan and the difficulties he felt in performing the duty a.s.signed to him, he added: ”But if Congress still think it necessary for me to proceed in the business I must request their more definite and explicit instructions and that they will permit me, previous to transmitting the intended dispatches, to submit them to their determination. I could wish to lay before Congress more minutely the state of the army, the condition of our supplies and the requisites necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the most serious events.
If Congress think this can be done more satisfactorily in a personal conference I hope to have the army in such a situation before I can receive their answer as to afford me an opportunity of giving my attendance.”
Congress acceded to his request for a personal interview, and on his arrival in Philadelphia a committee was appointed to confer with him as well on this particular subject as on the general state of the army and of the country.
The result of these conferences was that the expedition against Canada was entirely, though reluctantly, given up, and every arrangement recommended by Was.h.i.+ngton received that attention which was due to his judgment and experience and which his opinions were ent.i.tled to receive.
If anything were necessary to be added to this ridiculous scheme for the conquest of Canada in order to prove the inefficiency and folly of the Congress of 1778 we have it in the fact that France was averse to adding that province to the United States and did not desire to acquire it for herself. She only sought the independence of this country and its permanent alliance.
Mr. De Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History recites the private instructions to Mr. Gerard on his mission to the United States.
One article was, ”to avoid entering into any formal engagement relative to Canada and other English possessions which Congress proposed to conquer.” Mr. De Sevelinges adds, that ”the policy of the cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of Canada by England as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to the Americans. The neighborhood of a formidable enemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought to attach to the friends.h.i.+p and support of the King of France.”
[C.] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONFER WITH WAs.h.i.+NGTON ON THE SECOND SCHEME FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND ON THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY.
”January I, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the commander-in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report that the plan proposed by Congress for the emanc.i.p.ation of Canada, in cooperation with an army from France, was the princ.i.p.al subject of the said conference. That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part of these States, your committee have taken a general view of our finances, of the circ.u.mstances of our army, of the magazines of clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in store, and which can be collected in season.
”Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and observations communicated to them by the commander-in-chief, respecting the number of troops and strongholds of the enemy in Canada; their naval force, and entire command of the water communication with that country; the difficulties, while they possess such signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land; the obstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority; the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indian tribes towards these States; and above all, the uncertainty whether the enemy will not persevere in their system of hara.s.sing and distressing our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war.
”That on a most mature deliberation, your committee cannot find room for a well grounded presumption that these States will be able to perform their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure of such moment, calculated to call forth, and direct to a single object, a considerable portion of the force of our ally which may otherwise be essentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability of success could justify Congress in making the proposition.
”Your committee are therefore of opinion, that the negotiation in question, however desirable and interesting, should be deferred until circ.u.mstances render the cooperation of these States more certain, practicable, and effectual.
”That the minister plenipotentiary of these States at the court of Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister of France, be respectively informed that the operations of the next campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as well from our own internal circ.u.mstances and resources as the progress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and point out the plan which ought to be pursued. That Congress, therefore, cannot, with a degree of confidence answerable to the magnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of their cooperating the next campaign in an enterprise for the emanc.i.p.ation of Canada; that every preparation in our power will nevertheless be made for acting with vigor against the common enemy, and every favorable incident embraced with alacrity to facilitate and hasten the freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with these States--events which Congress, from motives of policy with respect to the United States, as well as of affection to their Canadian brethren, have greatly at heart.”