Part 23 (1/2)
”The brilliant action of General Sumter and the stratagem of Colonel Was.h.i.+ngton deserve great commendation. It gives me inexpressible pleasure to find that such a spirit of enterprise and intrepidity still prevails.” [1]
Writing to Greene again (on the 21st of March, 1781), he says: ”You may be a.s.sured that your retreat before Lord Cornwallis is highly applauded by all ranks and reflects much honor on your military abilities.” Such words, from such a man, must have inspirited Greene amidst his toils and perils.
Greene, writing to Was.h.i.+ngton three days after the battle of Guilford Courthouse, says: ”In my former letters I enclosed to your Excellency the probable strength of the British army, since which they have been constantly declining. Our force, as you will see by the returns, was respectable, and the probability of not being able to keep it long in the field, and the difficulty of subsisting men in this exhausted country, together with the great advantages which would result from the action if we were victorious, and the little injury if we were otherwise, determined me to bring on an action as soon as possible. When both parties are agreed in a matter all obstacles are soon removed. I thought the determination warranted by the soundest principles of good policy and I hope events will prove it so though we were unfortunate.
I regret nothing so much as the loss of my artillery, though it was of little use to us, nor can it be in this great wilderness. However, as the enemy have it, we must also.”
”Lord Cornwallis,” he writes in the same letter, ”will not give up this country without being roundly beaten. I wish our force was more competent to the business. But I am in hopes, by little and little, to reduce him in time. His troops are good, well found, and fight with great obstinacy.
”Virginia has given me every support I could wish or expect since Lord Cornwallis has been in North Carolina, and nothing has contributed more to this than the prejudice of the people in favor of your Excellency which has been extended to me from the friends.h.i.+p you have been pleased to honor me with.”
The reader will not fail to observe the soundness of Greene's judgment as to the beneficial effect of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It was truly a disastrous victory for Cornwallis and a fortunate defeat for Greene, whose subsequent operations we must now notice.
When Greene took his position at the ironworks on Troublesome creek after the battle of Guilford Courthouse he expected that Cornwallis would follow up his advantage and attack him without delay. He therefore prepared again to fight. His army, indeed, was much diminished, but he had lost more in numbers than in effective strength. The militia, many of whom had returned home, had shown themselves very inefficient in the field. As soon as he received certain information that instead of pursuing, Cornwallis was retreating, he resolved to follow him and advanced accordingly.
Greene was now in his turn the pursuer and followed Cornwallis so closely that skirmishes occasionally happened between his advanced parties and the rear guard of the British army, but no conflict of importance ensued. On the morning of the 28th of March he arrived at Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, a strong post which the British had evacuated a few hours before, crossing the river by a bridge erected for the purpose. There Greene paused and meditated on his future movements.
His army, like that of the British, for some time past had suffered much from heavy rains, deep roads, and scarcity of provisions. On reaching Ramsay's Mills his men were starving with hunger and fed voraciously on some fresh quarters of beef left behind by the British army. The troops were much exhausted and stood in need of repose and refreshment. Besides in that critical state of the campaign he found himself reduced to a handful of Continentals. Most of the militia had left him. Small as his army was he found great difficulty in procuring subsistence for it.
Cornwallis had fairly the start of the Americans and was advancing to a place where he would find more plentiful supplies and easily communicate with the sea; so that Greene was sensible that with the force then under his command he could make no impression on him. He resolved, therefore, instead of following his opponent, to proceed to South Carolina. That step, he thought, would oblige Cornwallis either to follow him or to abandon his posts in the upper parts of the southern States. If he followed him North Carolina would be relieved and enabled to raise its quota of men for the Continental service, but if he remained in that State or proceeded to the northward it was likely that the greater part of the British posts in South Carolina and Georgia would be reduced and that those States would be restored to the Union. He entertained little apprehension of Cornwallis being able with the force then under his command to make any permanent impression on the powerful State of Virginia.
Having refreshed his troops and collected provisions for a few days Greene moved from Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, on the 5th of April (1781), toward Camden, and on the morning of the 20th of the same month encamped at Logtown in sight of the British works at that place.
Soon after his arrival at Wilmington, Cornwallis received certain information that Greene was proceeding to South Carolina, and it threw him into much perplexity. He was alarmed for the safety of Lord Rawdon, but, though desirous of a.s.sisting him, he was convinced that the Americans were already so far advanced that it was impossible for him to arrive at Camden in time to succor Rawdon if he should need it. His lords.h.i.+p's fate and that of his garrison would probably be decided long before he could reach them, and if Greene should be successful at Camden, he, by attempting to relieve it, might be hemmed in between the great rivers and exposed to the most imminent hazard. On the other hand, if Rawdon should defeat Greene there would be no need of his a.s.sistance.
A movement so perilous in the execution and promising so little in the result was abandoned and Rawdon left to his own resources.
Greene, without regard to the movements of his opponent, pushed on and established himself at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile from Rawdon's headquarters at Camden. The militia having either deserted or their term of service being expired his force was reduced to 1,800 men, but those in fact included all on whom he could ever place much dependence.
Camden was occupied by Rawdon with about 800 men, the other troops being employed upon the defense of detached posts, yet his position was judged so strong as to afford no hope of success in a direct attack. The object aimed at was, by throwing out detachments which might capture the forts and cut off the supplies in his rear, to compel him gradually to fall back. Lee, for this purpose, was sent with a strong party to cooperate with Marion and Sumter. The English general seeing the hostile troops thus reduced to about 1,500, formed the bold resolution of attacking them. Making a large circuit round a swamp he came upon their left flank quite unexpectedly, while the soldiers were busied in cooking and was.h.i.+ng. This first surprise was never wholly recovered, yet they quickly stood to their arms and formed in order of battle. They had even gained some advantages when the First Maryland regiment, considered the flower of the army and which had highly distinguished itself both at Cowpens and Guilford, fell into confusion, and when ordered to make a retrograde movement, converted it into a complete retreat. The other corps also, beginning to give ground, Greene thought it expedient to cause the whole to retire. The loss on each side was about 260 killed and wounded, and the Americans carried off fifty prisoners, including six officers.
This battle, commonly called the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, reflected much honor on Lord Rawdon considering the disproportion of force which was, in fact, greater than at Guilford, yet it did not change materially the relative situation of the armies. Greene could still maintain his position and support the detachments operating in the rear of his adversary.
Lee and Marion proceeded next against Fort Watson on the Santee which commanded in a great measure the communication with Charleston. Having neither artillery nor besieging tools they reared a tower above the level of the rampart whence their rifle fire drove the defenders, and themselves then mounted and compelled the garrison to surrender. They could not, however, prevent Colonel Watson from leading 500 men to reinforce Lord Rawdon, who then advanced with the intention of bringing Greene again to action, but found him fallen back upon so strong a position as to afford no reasonable hope of success. His lords.h.i.+p finding his convoys intercepted and viewing the generally insecure state of his posts in the lower country, considered himself under at least the temporary necessity of retreating thither. He had first in view the relief of Mott's House, on the Congaree, but before reaching it had the mortification to find that with the garrison of 165 it had fallen into the hands of Marion and Lee. He continued his march to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and the surrounding country.
The partisan chiefs rapidly seized this opportunity of attacking the interior posts and reduced successively Orangeburg and Granby on the Congaree, and early in June, Augusta, the key of upper Georgia, surrendered to Lee and Pickens. In these five forts they made 1,100 prisoners. The most important one, however, was that named Ninety-Six, on the Saluda, defended by a garrison of 500 men. Orders had been sent to them to quit and retire downward but the messenger was intercepted and Colonel Cruger, the commander, made the most active preparations for its defense. Greene considered the place of such importance that he undertook the siege in person with 1,000 regulars. He broke ground before it on the night of the 23d of May (1781), and though much impeded by a successful sally on the following day, proceeded with such energy that by the 3d of June the second parallel was completed and the garrison summoned, but in vain, to surrender. On the 8th, he was reinforced by Lee from the capture of Augusta and though he encountered a most gallant and effective resistance trusted that the place must in due time fall. Three days after, however, he learned that Rawdon, having received a reinforcement from Ireland, was in full march to relieve it and had baffled the attempts of Sumter to impede his progress. The American leader, therefore, feeling himself unable to give battle saw no prospect of carrying the fortress unless by storm. On the 18th (June, 1781), an attack against the two most commanding outworks was led by Lee and Campbell, the former of whom carried his point, but the latter, though he penetrated into the ditch and maintained his party there for three-quarters of an hour, found them exposed to so destructive a fire as compelled a general retreat. [2] The siege was immediately raised and Lord Rawdon, on the 21st, entered the place in triumph. Being again master of the field, he pressed forward in the hope of bringing his antagonist to battle but the latter rather chose to fall back towards the distant point of Charlotte in Virginia, while Rawdon did not attempt to pursue him beyond the Ennoree.
Notwithstanding this present superiority his lords.h.i.+p, having failed in his hopes of a decisive victory and viewing the general aspect of the country, considered it no longer possible to attempt more than covering the lower districts, of South Carolina. He therefore fell back to Orangeburg on the Edisto and though he attempted at first to maintain Cruger with a strong body at Ninety-Six was soon induced to recall him. Greene, being reinforced by 1,000 men under Marion and Sumter, reconnoitered his position but, judging it imprudent to attack, retired to the high hills of the Santee, July the 15th (1781), and both armies, exhausted by such a series of active movements, took an interval of repose during the heat of the season.
Lord Rawdon being at this time obliged by ill health to return to England left the army under the command of Colonel Stuart, who, to cover the lower country, occupied a position at the point where the Congaree and Wateree unite in forming the Santee. Greene, having received reinforcements from the North and collected all his partisan detachments soon found himself strong enough to try the chance of battle. His approach on the 7th of September (1781) with this evident view induced the British to retire down the river to the strong post of Eutaw Springs, whither the American army immediately followed.
On the 8th of September, Greene determined to attack the British camp, placing as usual his militia in front, hoping that the English in charging them would get into confusion, but from apprehension of this the latter had been warned to keep their posts till ordered to move. The American front, however, maintained their ground better than usual and the British having become heated and forgetting the warnings given pushed forward irregularly. They were then charged by the veterans of the second line and after a very desperate struggle driven off the field. There lay in their way, however, a large brick building and adjacent garden, where Stuart had placed a strong corps which could not be dislodged and which kept up a deadly fire which checked the victors, enabling the retreating troops to be formed anew. At the same time Colonel Was.h.i.+ngton attacked the British flank, but finding it strongly posted amongst the woods he was repulsed with great loss and himself taken prisoner. The American general seeing no hope of making any further impression, retreated to his previous position. The conflict lasted four hours and great bravery was shown on both sides. Colonel Campbell was mortally wounded. Learning the British were dispersing he exclaimed, like Wolfe at Quebec, ”Then I die contented!” and immediately expired.
In this b.l.o.o.d.y and doubtful battle both parties claimed the victory though the Americans with most reason as the general result was greatly to their advantage. It was certainly far from decisive and the British loss in killed and wounded was much greater than that of the Americans, who also carried off above 500 prisoners. The British commander, prompted as well probably by the result of the day as by the general state of the country and the numbers and activity of the American light troops, conceiving himself unable to maintain so advanced a position, retired during the evening of the 9th (September 1781), and proceeded down to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and its vicinity. To this and to Savannah were now limited that proud British authority which had lately extended so widely over the southern States. [3]
Thus ended the campaign of 1781 in South Carolina. At its commencement the British were in force all over the State. History affords but a few instances of commanders who have achieved so much with equal means as was done by General Greene in the short s.p.a.ce of twelve months. He opened the campaign with gloomy prospects but closed it with glory.
His unpaid and half-naked army had to contend with veteran soldiers, supplied with everything that the wealth of Great Britain or the plunder of Carolina could procure. Under all these disadvantages he compelled superior numbers to retire from the extremity of the State, and confine themselves in the capital and its vicinity. Had not his mind been of the firmest texture he would have been discouraged, but his enemies found him as formidable on the evening of a defeat as on the morning after a victory.
The reader will not fail to perceive how important a bearing the operations of Greene in the South had upon those of Was.h.i.+ngton in the North. Before recovering North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, Greene had partly led and partly driven Cornwallis into Virginia, where he was destined to be conquered by Was.h.i.+ngton and the war was thus to be virtually terminated. How this was accomplished will now be the object of our attention. Virginia had insensibly, as it were, become the princ.i.p.al theater of war. General Leslie had been sent thither to reinforce Cornwallis, who it was hoped might penetrate through the Carolinas, but after Ferguson's disaster he was ordered to go round by Charleston. With the view, however, of creating a diversion in favor of the southern army, Clinton, in December, 1780, sent Arnold with 1,600 men to the Chesapeake. That infamous traitor, displaying all his wonted activity, overran a great extent of country and captured Richmond, the capital, destroying great quant.i.ties of stores. Was.h.i.+ngton, most anxious to strike a blow against him, prevailed upon Destouches, the French admiral to proceed thither with a land force but the latter was overtaken by Arbuthnot and endured a hard battle which though not admitted to be a defeat obliged him to return to Newport; thus Arnold escaped the danger of falling into the hands of his enraged countrymen.
Clinton, still with the same view, sent another force of 2,000 men under General Phillips which arrived in the Chesapeake on the 26th of March (1781). This officer being complete master of the field, overran the country between the James and York rivers, seized the town of Petersburg, as also Chesterfield Courthouse, the militia rendezvous, and other stations, destroying great quant.i.ties of s.h.i.+pping and stores, with all the warehoused tobacco. Lafayette, then in command of about 3,000 men for the defense of Virginia, succeeded by skilful maneuvering in securing Richmond.
Operations seemed at a stand, when, late in April, intelligence was received of Cornwallis' march from South Carolina toward Virginia and, in spite of every effort of Lafayette, he, at the end of May (1781), joined Phillips at Petersburg, taking the command of the whole army.