Part 38 (1/2)

The probability of failing in any attempt to hold the mouth of the Mississippi by force, and the resentments against Great Britain which prevailed generally throughout the western country, diminished the danger to be apprehended from any machinations of that power, but against those of Spain the same security did not exist.

In contemplating the situation of the United States in their relations not purely domestic the object demanding most immediate consideration was the hostility of several tribes of Indians. The military strength of the nations who inhabited the country between the lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio was computed at 5,000 men, of whom about 1,500 were at open war with the United States. Treaties had been concluded with the residue, but the warlike disposition of the Indians, and the provocations they had received, furnished reasons for apprehending that these treaties would soon be broken.

In the South the Creeks, who could bring into the field 6,000 fighting men, were at war with Georgia. In the mind of their leader, M'Gillivray, the son of a white man, some irritation had been produced by the confiscation of the lands of his father who had resided in that State, and several other refugees, whose property had also been confiscated, contributed still further to exasperate the nation. But the immediate point in contest between them was a tract of land on the Oconee, which the State of Georgia claimed under a purchase, the validity of which was denied by the Indians.

The regular force of the United States was less than 600 men.

Not only the policy of accommodating differences by negotiation which the government was in no condition to terminate by the sword, but a real respect for the rights of the natives and a regard for the claims of justice and humanity, disposed Was.h.i.+ngton to endeavor, in the first instance, to remove every cause of quarrel by a treaty, and his message to Congress on this subject evidenced his preference of pacific measures.

Possessing many valuable articles of commerce for which the best market was often found on the coast of the Mediterranean, struggling to export them in their own bottoms, and unable to afford a single gun for their protection, the Americans could not view with unconcern the dispositions which were manifested toward them by the Barbary powers. A treaty had been formed with the Emperor of Morocco, but from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli peace had not been purchased, and those regencies considered all as enemies to whom they had not sold their friends.h.i.+p. The unprotected vessels of America presented a tempting object to their rapacity, and their hostility was the more terrible, because by their public law prisoners became slaves.

The United States were at peace with all the powers of Europe, but controversies of a delicate nature existed with some of them, the adjustment of which required a degree of moderation and firmness which there was reason to fear might not, in every instance, be exhibited.

The apprehensions with which Spain had contemplated the future strength of the United States, and the consequent disposition to restrict them to narrow limits, have been already noticed. After the conclusion of the war the attempt to form a treaty with that power had been repeated, but no advance toward an agreement on the points Of difference between the two governments had been made.

Circ.u.mstances attending the points of difference with Great Britain were still more serious, because, in their progress, a temper unfavorable to accommodation had been uniformly displayed.

The resentments produced by the various calamities war had occasioned were not terminated with their cause. The idea that Great Britain was the natural enemy of America had become habitual. Believing it impossible for that nation to have relinquished its views of conquest, many found it difficult to bury their animosities and to act upon the sentiment contained in the Declaration of Independence, ”to hold them as the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.” In addition to the complaints respecting the violation of the treaty of peace events were continually supplying this temper with fresh aliment.

The disinclination which the cabinet of London had discovered to a commercial treaty with the United States was not attributed exclusively to the cause which had been a.s.signed for it. It was in part ascribed to that jealousy with which Britain was supposed to view the growing trade of America.

The general restrictions on commerce by which every maritime power sought to promote its own navigation, and that part of the European system in particular by which each aimed at a monopoly of the trade of its Colonies, were felt with peculiar keenness when enforced by England.

In this suspicious temper almost every unfavorable event which occurred was traced up to British hostility.

That an attempt to form a commercial treaty with Portugal had failed, was attributed to the influence of the cabinet of London, and to the machinations of the same power were also ascribed the danger from the corsairs of Barbary and the b.l.o.o.d.y incursions of the Indians. The resentment excited by these causes was felt by a large proportion of the American people, and the expression of it was common and public. That correspondent dispositions existed in England is by no means improbable, and the necessary effect of this temper was to increase the difficulty of adjusting the differences between the two nations.

With France the most perfect harmony subsisted. Those attachments which originated in the signal services received from the King of France during the war of the Revolution had sustained no diminution. Yet, from causes which it was found difficult to counteract, the commercial intercourse between the two nations was not so extensive as had been expected. It was the interest and, of consequence, the policy of France, to avail herself of the misunderstandings between the United States and Great Britain, in order to obtain such regulations as might gradually divert the increasing trade of the American continent from those channels in which it had been accustomed to flow, and a disposition was felt throughout the United States to cooperate with her in enabling her merchants, by legislative encouragements, to rival those of Britain in the American market.

A great revolution had commenced in that country, the first stage of which was completed by limiting the powers of the monarch, and by the establishment of a popular a.s.sembly. In no part of the globe was this revolution hailed with more joy than in America. The influence it would have on the affairs of the world was not then distinctly foreseen, and the philanthropist, without becoming a political partisan, rejoiced in the event. On this subject, therefore, but one sentiment existed.

The relations of the United States with the other powers of Europe did not require particular attention. Their dispositions were rather friendly than otherwise, and an inclination was generally manifested to partic.i.p.ate in the advantages which the erection of an independent empire on the western sh.o.r.es of the Atlantic held forth to the commercial world.

By the ministers of foreign powers in America it would readily be supposed that the first steps taken by the new government would not only be indicative of its present system, but would probably affect its foreign relations permanently, and that the influence of the President would be felt in the Legislature. Scarcely was the exercise of his executive functions commenced when Was.h.i.+ngton received an application from the Count de Moustiers, the minister of France, requesting a private conference. On being told that the Department of Foreign Affairs was the channel through which all official business should pa.s.s, the count replied that the interview he requested was not for the purpose of actual business, but rather as preparatory to its future transaction.

The next day, at 1 in the afternoon, was named for the interview. The count commenced the conversation with declarations of his personal regard for America, the manifestations of which, he said, had been early and uniform. His nation, too, was well disposed to be upon terms of amity with the United States, but at his public reception there were occurrences which he thought indicative of coolness in the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who had, he feared, while in Europe, imbibed prejudices, not only against Spain, but against France also. If this conjecture should be right the present head of that department could not be an agreeable organ of intercourse with the President. He then took a view of the modern usages of European courts, which, he said, favored the practice he recommended, of permitting foreign ministers to make their communications directly to the chief of the executive. ”He then presented a letter,” says Was.h.i.+ngton in his private journal, ”which he termed confidential, and to be considered as addressed to me in my private character, which was too strongly marked with an intention, as well as a wish, to have no person between the minister and President in the transaction of business between the two nations.”

In reply to these observations Was.h.i.+ngton a.s.sured him that, judging from his own feelings and from the public sentiment, there existed in America a reciprocal disposition to be on the best terms with France. That whatever former difficulties might have occurred he was persuaded the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had offered no intentional disrespect either to the minister or to his nation. Without undertaking to know the private opinions of Mr. Jay he would declare that he had never heard that officer express, directly or indirectly, any sentiment unfavorable to either.

Reason and usage, he added, must direct the mode of treating national and official business. If rules had been established they must be conformed to. If they were yet to be framed it was hoped that they would be convenient and proper. So far as case could be made to comport with regularity and with necessary forms, it ought to be consulted, but custom, and the dignity of office, were not to be disregarded. The conversation continued upward of an hour, but no change was made in the resolution of the President.

During its first session the national Legislature was princ.i.p.ally occupied in providing revenues for the long-exhausted treasury, in establis.h.i.+ng a judiciary, in organizing the executive departments in detail, and in framing amendments to the const.i.tution, agreeably to the suggestion of the President. The members immediately entered upon the exercise of those powers so long refused under the articles of confederation. They imposed a tonnage duty, as well as duties on various imported articles, steadily keeping in sight, however, the navigating interest of the country, which had hitherto been almost wholly at the mercy of other nations. Higher tonnage duties were imposed on foreign than on American bottoms, and goods imported in vessels belonging to citizens of the United States paid 10 per cent less duty than the same goods brought in those owned by foreigners. These discriminating duties were intended to counteract the commercial regulations of foreign nations and to encourage American s.h.i.+pping. To aid in the management of the affairs of government three executive departments were established, styled Departments of War, Foreign Affairs, and of the Treasury, with a secretary at the head of each.

The heads of these departments, in addition to the duties specially a.s.signed them, were intended to const.i.tute a council, to be consulted by the President whenever he thought proper, and the Executive was authorized by the const.i.tution to require the opinion, in writing, of the princ.i.p.al officers in the executive departments, on subjects relating to the duties of their offices. In framing the acts const.i.tuting these offices and defining their duties, it became an important subject of inquiry in what manner or by whom these important officers could be removed from office. This was a question as new as it was momentous and was applicable to all officers of executive appointment. In the long and learned debates on the subject in Congress, there arose a very animated opposition to such a construction of the const.i.tution as to give this power to any one individual. Whatever confidence might be placed in the chief magistrate then at the head of the government, equal confidence could not be expected in his successors, and it was contended that a concurrence of the Senate was as necessary and proper in the removal of a person from office as in his appointment. Some of the members of the House of Representatives were of opinion that they could not be removed without impeachment. The princ.i.p.al question, however, on which Congress was divided, was, whether they were removable by the President alone, or by the President in concurrence with the Senate. A majority, however, in both houses, decided that this power was in the President alone. In the House, the majority in favor of this construction was twelve. This decision of a great const.i.tutional question has been acquiesced in, and in its consequences has been of greater importance than almost any other since the establishment of the new government. From the manner in which this power has been exercised, it has given a tone and character to the executive branch of the government not contemplated, it is believed, by the framers of the const.i.tution or by those who const.i.tuted the first Congress under it. It has greatly increased the influence and patronage of the President and in no small degree made him the center around which the other branches of the government revolve. [4]

In a free country, where the private citizen has both the right and the inclination to take an interest in the public concerns, it is natural that political parties and civil contentions should arise. These will be more or less violent, angry, and hostile, according as a sense of common security from external dangers leaves no cause for united action, and little anxiety for the common peace. A natural consequence of this strife of parties is the exercise of the pa.s.sions--pride, interest, vanity, resentment, grat.i.tude--each contributing its share in irritating and prolonging the controversy. In the beginning of the Revolution, the people of the United States divided themselves into the two great cla.s.ses of Whigs and Tories; then they again separated upon the question of absolute independence. Other questions arose during the war, relative to its conduct, and the qualifications of the leaders of the army.

Independence achieved, the minds of the people were agitated about the nature of the government, which all saw to be necessary for their own happiness, and for the better enabling them to prosecute with foreign countries peaceful negotiations or the operations of war. Many saw, in too close a union, dangers as great and consequences as distasteful as in their entire separation. It was believed by many that the extent of the country, the great diversity of character, habits, and pursuits among the several States, presented insuperable obstacles to a closer union than that afforded by the articles of confederation. Some were almost exclusively commercial, others agricultural; some were disposed to engage in manufacturing pursuits; some had domestic slavery firmly connected with their domestic relations and were disposed to look favorably on the extension of the inst.i.tution; others regarded involuntary servitude as a curse, and desired its abolition.

It was not to be wondered at, that with such points of diversity, many should suppose that a single government could not administer the affairs of all, except by a greater delegation of power than would be submitted to by the American people. While some looked wholly to these apprehended consequences of a close union and a single government, others chiefly regarded the dangers arising from disunion, domestic dissensions, and even war. One party dreaded consolidation; the other, anarchy and separation. Each saw, in the object of its dread, the destruction of good government, though one party looked too exclusively to its characteristic of order, the other to that of civil liberty. These were the thoughts of the people, widely different, but all equally honest.

But the politicians addressed themselves to these prejudices, often with unworthy motives. Local prejudices, self-interest, fears, in some cases from an antic.i.p.ated loss of consequence, in the event of a transfer of sovereignty from the individual States to the general government, all combined to make many violent in their expressions of opposition to the plan. Apprehensions of violence and disorder, and fears from individual popularity in a circ.u.mscribed sphere, led others to desire consolidation. With these, ranked others who were fond of the pomp and show of authority which would attend a powerful government; and still others, who, having claims upon the country, supposed that they would have much stronger hopes of being paid themselves and of seeing the debts due abroad liquidated if a system of government were established which could be certain to raise a revenue for these objects. On the formation of the const.i.tution, the community settled down into two great parties, Federalists and Anti-Federalists, or Democrats; the first believing that the most imminent danger to our peace and prosperity was in disunion, and that popular jealousy, always active, would withhold the power which was essential to good order and national safety; the other party believing that the danger most to be apprehended was in too close a union, and that their most powerful opponents wished a consolidated and even a monarchial government.