Part 42 (1/2)

It would also increase an evil which was already sensibly felt. The State debts, when a.s.sumed by the continent, would, as that of the Union had already done, acc.u.mulate in large cities; and the dissatisfaction excited by the payment of taxes would be increased by perceiving that the money raised from the people flowed into the hands of a few individuals. Still greater mischief was to be apprehended. A great part of this additional debt would go into the hands of foreigners, and the United States would be heavily burdened to pay an interest which could not be expected to remain in the country.

The measure was unjust, because it was burdening those States which had taxed themselves highly to discharge the claims of their creditors with the debts of those which had not made the same exertions. It would delay the settlement of accounts between the individual States and the United States, and the supporters of the measure were openly charged with intending to defeat that settlement.

It was also said that in its execution the scheme would be found extremely embarra.s.sing, perhaps impracticable. The case of a partial accession to the measure by the creditors, a case which would probably occur, presented a difficulty for which no provision was made, and of which no solution had been given. Should the creditors in some States come into the system, and those in others refuse to change their security, the government would be involved in perplexities from which no means of extricating itself had been shown. Nor would it be practicable to discriminate between the debts contracted for general and for local objects.

In the course of the debate severe allusions were made to the conduct of particular States, and the opinions advanced in favor of the measure were ascribed to local interests.

In support of the a.s.sumption, the debts of the States were traced to their origin. America, it was said, had engaged in a war the object of which was equally interesting to every part of the Union. It was not the war of a particular State, but of the United States. It was not the liberty and independence of a part, but of the whole, for which they had contended, and which they had acquired. The cause was a common cause. As brethren, the American people had consented to hazard property and life in its defense. All the sums expended in the attainment of this great object, whatever might be the authority under which they were raised or appropriated, conduced to the same end. Troops were raised, and military stores purchased, before Congress a.s.sumed the command of the army or the control of the war. The ammunition which repulsed the enemy at Bunker's Hill was purchased by Ma.s.sachusetts, and formed a part of the debt of that State.

Nothing could be more erroneous than the principle which had been a.s.sumed in argument, that the holders of securities issued by individual States were to be considered merely as State creditors, as if the debt had been contracted on account of the particular State. It was contracted on account of the Union, in that common cause in which all were equally interested.

From the complex nature of the political system which had been adopted in America, the war was, in a great measure, carried on through the agency of the State governments, and the debts were, in truth, the debts of the Union, for which the States had made themselves responsible.

Except the civil list, the whole State expenditure was in the prosecution of the war, and the State taxes had undeniably exceeded the provision for their civil list. The foundation for the several cla.s.ses of the debt was reviewed in detail, and it was affirmed to be proved from the review, and from the books in the public offices, that, in its origin, a great part of it, even in form, and the whole, in fact, was equitably due from the continent. The States individually possessing all the resources of the nation, became responsible to certain descriptions of the public creditors. But they were the agents of the continent in contracting the debt, and its distribution among them for payment arose from the division of political power which existed under the old confederation. A new arrangement of the system had taken place, and a power over the resources of the nation was conferred on the general government. With the funds the debt also ought to be a.s.sumed. This investigation of its origin demonstrated that the a.s.sumption was not the creation of a new debt, but the reacknowledgment of liability for an old one, the payment of which had devolved on those members of the system who, at the time, were alone capable of paying it. And thence was inferred not only the justice of the measure, but a complete refutation of the arguments drawn from the const.i.tution. If, in point of fact, the debt was in its origin continental and had been transferred to the States for greater facility of payment, there could be no const.i.tutional objection to restoring its original and real character.

The great powers of war, of taxation, and of borrowing money, which were vested in Congress to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, comprised that in question.

There could be no more doubt of their right to charge themselves with the payment of a debt contracted in the past war, than to borrow money for the prosecution of a future war. The impolicy of leaving the public creditors to receive payment from different sources was also strongly pressed, and the jealousy which would exist between the creditors of the Union and of the States was considered as a powerful argument in favor of giving them one common interest. This jealousy, it was feared, might be carried so far as even to create an opposition to the laws of the Union.

If the State should provide for their creditors, the same sum of money must be collected from the people as would be required if the debt should be a.s.sumed, and it would probably be collected in a manner more burdensome than if one uniform system should be established. If all should not make such provision, it would be unjust to leave the soldier of one State unpaid, while the services of the man who fought by his side were amply compensated, and, after having a.s.sumed the funds, it would dishonor the general government to permit a creditor, for services rendered or property advanced for the continent, to remain unsatisfied, because his claim had been transferred to the State at a time when the State alone possessed the means of payment. By the injured and neglected creditor such an arrangement might justly be considered as a disreputable artifice.

Instead of delaying, it was believed to be a measure which would facilitate the settlement of accounts between the States. Its advocates declared that they did not entertain and never had entertained any wish to procrastinate a settlement. On the contrary it was greatly desired by them. They had themselves brought forward propositions for that purpose, and they invited their adversaries to a.s.sist in improving the plan which had been introduced.

The settlement between the States, it was said, either would or would not be made. Should it ever take place, it would remedy any inequalities which might grow out of the a.s.sumption. Should it never take place, the justice of the measure became the more apparent. That the burdens in support of a common war, which from various causes had devolved unequally on the States, ought to be apportioned among them, was a truth too clear to be controverted, and this, if the settlement should never be accomplished, could be effected only by the measure now proposed.

Indeed, in any event, it would be the only certain, as well as only eligible plan. For how were the debtor States to be compelled to pay the balances which should be found against them?

If the measure was recommended by considerations which rendered its ultimate adoption inevitable, the present was clearly preferable to any future time. It was desirable immediately to quiet the minds of the public creditors by a.s.suring them that justice would be done, to simplify the forms of public debt, and to put an end to that speculation which had been so much reprobated and which could be terminated only by giving the debt a real and permanent value.

That the a.s.sumption would impair the just influence of the States was controverted with great strength of argument. The diffusive representation in the State Legislatures, the intimate connection between the representative and his const.i.tuents, the influence of the State Legislatures over the members of one branch of the national Legislature, the nature of the powers exercise by the State governments, which perpetually presented them to the people in a point of view calculated to lay hold of the public affections, were guarantees that the States would retain their due weight in the political system and that a debt was not necessary to the solidity or duration of their power.

But the argument, it was said, proved too much. If a debt was now essential to the preservation of State authority it would always be so. It must therefore never be extinguished, but must be perpetuated in order to secure the existence of the State governments. If, for this purpose, it was indispensable that the expenses of the Revolutionary War should be borne by the States, it would not be less indispensable that the expenses of future wars should be borne in the same manner. Either the argument was unfounded or the const.i.tution was wrong, and the powers of the sword and the purse ought not to have been conferred on the government of the Union. Whatever speculative opinions might be entertained on this point, they were to administer the government according to the principles of the const.i.tution as it was framed. But, it was added, if so much power followed the a.s.sumption as the objection implies, is it not time to ask--is it safe to forbear a.s.suming? If the power is so dangerous it will be so when exercised by the States. If a.s.suming tends to consolidation, is the reverse, tending to disunion, a less weighty objection? If it is answered that the non-a.s.sumption will not necessarily tend to disunion, neither, it may be replied, does the a.s.sumption necessarily tend to consolidation.

It was not admitted that the a.s.sumption would tend to perpetuate the debt. It could not be presumed that the general government would be less willing than the local governments to discharge it; nor could it be presumed that the means were less attainable by the former than the latter.

It was not contended that a public debt was a public blessing. Whether a debt was to be preferred to no debt was not the question. The debt was already contracted, and the question so far as policy might be consulted, was, whether it was more for the public advantage to give it such a form as would render it applicable to the purposes of a circulating medium, or to leave it a mere subject of speculation, incapable of being employed to any useful purpose. The debt was admitted to be an evil, but it was an evil from which, if wisely modified, some benefit might be extracted, and which, in its present state, could have only a mischievous operation.

If the debt should be placed on adequate funds, its operation on public credit could not be pernicious; in its present precarious condition, there was much more to be apprehended in that respect.

To the objection that it would acc.u.mulate in large cities, it was answered it would be a moneyed capital, and would be held by those who chose to place money at interest, but by funding the debt the present possessors would be enabled to part with it at its nominal value, instead of selling it at its present current rate. If it should center in the hands of foreigners, the sooner it was appreciated to its proper standard, the greater quant.i.ty of specie would its transfer bring into the United States.

To the injustice of charging those States which had made great exertions for the payment of their debts with the burden properly belonging to those which had not made such exertions, it was answered that every State must be considered as having exerted itself to the utmost of its resources, and that if it could not or would not make provision for creditors to whom the Union was equitably bound, the argument in favor of an a.s.sumption was the stronger.

The arguments drawn from local interests were repelled and retorted, and a great degree of irritation was excited on both sides.

After a very animated discussion of several days, the question was taken, and the resolution was carried by a small majority. Soon after this decision, while the subject was pending before the House, the delegates from North Carolina took their seats, and changed the strength of parties. By a majority of two voices, the resolution was recommitted, and, after a long and ardent debate, was negatived by the same majority.

This proposition continued to be supported with a degree of earnestness which its opponents termed pertinacious, but not a single opinion was changed. It was brought forward in the new and less exceptionable form of a.s.suming specific sums from each State. Under this modification of the principle, the extraordinary contributions of particular States during the war, and their exertions since the peace, might be regarded, and the objections to the measure, drawn from the uncertainty of the sum to be a.s.sumed, would be removed. But these alterations produced no change of sentiment, and the bill was sent up to the Senate with a provision for those creditors only whose certificates of debt purported to be payable by the Union.

In this state of things the measure is understood to have derived aid from another, which was of a nature strongly to interest particular parts of the Union.

From the month of June, 1783, when Congress was driven from Philadelphia by the mutiny of a part of the Pennsylvania line, the necessity of selecting some place for a permanent residence, in which the government of the Union might exercise sufficient authority to protect itself from violence and insult, had been generally acknowledged. Scarcely any subject had occupied more time, or had more agitated the members of the former Congress than this.

In December, 1784, an ordinance was pa.s.sed for appointing commissioners to purchase land on the Delaware, in the neighborhood of its falls, and to erect thereon the necessary public buildings for the reception of Congress and the officers of government; but the southern interest had been sufficiently strong to arrest the execution of this ordinance by preventing an appropriation of funds, which required the a.s.sent of nine States. Under the existing government, this subject had received the early attention of Congress, and many different situations, from the Delaware to the Potomac inclusive, had been earnestly supported, but a majority of both houses had not concurred in favor of any one place.