Part I (Prima Pars) Part 2 (1/2)

Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of G.o.d's arm, the literal sense is not that G.o.d has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

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QUESTION 2

THE EXISTENCE OF G.o.d (In Three Articles)

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of G.o.d, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat:

(1) Of G.o.d;

(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards G.o.d;

(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to G.o.d.

In treating of G.o.d there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider:

(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;

(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;

(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:

(1) Whether G.o.d exists?

(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is _not_ the manner of His existence;

(3) Whatever concerns His operations--namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the proposition ”G.o.d exists” is self-evident?

(2) Whether it is demonstrable?

(3) Whether G.o.d exists?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether the Existence of G.o.d Is Self-Evident?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of G.o.d is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), ”the knowledge of G.o.d is naturally implanted in all.” Therefore the existence of G.o.d is self-evident.

Obj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.

Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word ”G.o.d” is understood, it is at once seen that G.o.d exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word ”G.o.d” is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition ”G.o.d exists” is self-evident.

Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition ”Truth does not exist” is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But G.o.d is truth itself: ”I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6) Therefore ”G.o.d exists” is self-evident.

_On the contrary,_ No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition ”G.o.d is” can be mentally admitted: ”The fool said in his heart, There is no G.o.d” (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that G.o.d exists is not self-evident.

_I answer that,_ A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as ”Man is an animal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the t.i.tle of which is: ”Whether all that is, is good”), ”that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in s.p.a.ce.” Therefore I say that this proposition, ”G.o.d exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because G.o.d is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3, Art. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of G.o.d, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by effects.