Part I (Prima Pars) Part 4 (1/2)
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to G.o.d; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where G.o.d says: ”But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul.” Therefore G.o.d is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are pa.s.sions of the composite. But these are attributed to G.o.d in Scripture: ”The Lord was exceeding angry with His people” (Ps. 105:40). Therefore G.o.d is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.
But G.o.d seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quant.i.ty is the first property of matter. But G.o.d is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in G.o.d.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3) that G.o.d is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that G.o.d should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is partic.i.p.ated, inasmuch as matter partic.i.p.ates the form. Now the first good and the best--viz. G.o.d--is not a partic.i.p.ated good, because the essential good is prior to the partic.i.p.ated good. Hence it is impossible that G.o.d should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now G.o.d is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to G.o.d because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to G.o.d on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, G.o.d's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is G.o.d. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in G.o.d.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether G.o.d is the Same as His Essence or Nature?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of G.o.d--i.e. the G.o.dhead--is said to be in G.o.d. Therefore it seems that G.o.d is not the same as His essence or nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect is a.s.similated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_ is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore G.o.d is not the same as His G.o.dhead.
_On the contrary,_ It is said of G.o.d that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: ”I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6). Now the relation between G.o.dhead and G.o.d is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore G.o.d is His very G.o.dhead.
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguis.h.i.+ng this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal const.i.tuent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to _this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._ Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since G.o.d then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own G.o.dhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of G.o.d, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that G.o.dhead, or life, or the like are in G.o.d, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: The effects of G.o.d do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in G.o.d. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that G.o.d is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: ”For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood” (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore G.o.d's existence is not His essence.
Obj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ G.o.d exists as said above (Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore G.o.d's existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or nature.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): ”In G.o.d existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.” Therefore what subsists in G.o.d is His existence.
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the const.i.tuent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the const.i.tuent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential const.i.tuent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of G.o.d; because we call G.o.d the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in G.o.d His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in G.o.d there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by partic.i.p.ation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by partic.i.p.ation.