Part I (Prima Pars) Part 18 (2/2)
And thus G.o.d is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]
Whether G.o.d Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know G.o.d in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that ”reason does not grasp simple form.” But G.o.d is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of G.o.d, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know G.o.d by natural knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of G.o.d belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): ”The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.” Therefore G.o.d cannot be known by natural reason.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), ”That which is known of G.o.d,” namely, what can be known of G.o.d by natural reason, ”is manifest in them.”
_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of G.o.d; because the sensible effects of G.o.d do not equal the power of G.o.d as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of G.o.d cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of G.o.d ”whether He exists,” and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relations.h.i.+p with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know ”what it is”; but it can know ”whether it is.”
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.
Reply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of G.o.d's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.
i), retracting what he had said before: ”I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'G.o.d who willest that only the pure should know truth.'
For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths,” i.e. by natural reason.
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THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]
Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of G.o.d Can Be Obtained Than by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of G.o.d is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to G.o.d in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to G.o.d while ignoring of Him ”what He is,”
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore G.o.d is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that ”it is impossible for the divine ray to s.h.i.+ne upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils.” Therefore we cannot know G.o.d more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Obj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to G.o.d by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that ”things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.” Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of G.o.d by grace.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that ”G.o.d hath revealed to us His spirit,” what ”none of the princes of this world knew” (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of G.o.d by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
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