Part I (Prima Pars) Part 20 (1/2)
Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to G.o.d in Its Literal Sense?
Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to G.o.d. For all names which we apply to G.o.d are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to G.o.d metaphorically, as when we say, G.o.d is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense.
Obj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as ”good,” ”wise,” and the like are more truly withheld from G.o.d than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
ii). Therefore none of these names belong to G.o.d in their literal sense.
Obj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), ”Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to G.o.d metaphorically by way of similitude.”
Therefore not all names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.
_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of G.o.d is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in G.o.d in a more eminent way than in creatures.
Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to G.o.d--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to G.o.d, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to G.o.d; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as ”stone” signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to G.o.d only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of partic.i.p.ation being part of their signification as the words ”being,” ”good,” ”living,” and the like, and such names can be literally applied to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of G.o.d for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that G.o.d is above all substance and all life.
Reply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to G.o.d literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to G.o.d metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]
Whether Names Applied to G.o.d Are Synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to G.o.d are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to G.o.d mean entirely the same thing in G.o.d; for the goodness of G.o.d is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But G.o.d is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to G.o.d do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, ”vesture clothing.” Therefore if all names applied to G.o.d are synonymous, we cannot properly say ”good G.o.d” or the like, and yet it is written, ”O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name” (Jer. 32:18).
_I answer that,_ These names spoken of G.o.d are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of G.o.d, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows G.o.d from creatures, in order to understand G.o.d, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in G.o.d unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to G.o.d signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of G.o.d requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]
Whether What Is Said of G.o.d and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them?
Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to G.o.d and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name ”dog” be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of G.o.d and creatures, is predicated univocally.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.