Part I (Prima Pars) Part 28 (1/2)
Therefore there are not in G.o.d ideas of all things known by Him.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that G.o.d knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in G.o.d of all things known by Him.
_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But G.o.d has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of G.o.d. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an ”exemplar,” and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a ”type,” and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by G.o.d in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by G.o.d, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by G.o.d not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in G.o.d, neither in so far as an idea is an ”exemplar” nor as a ”type.”
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in G.o.d in so far as idea signifies an ”exemplar” but only in so far as it denotes a ”type.”
Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by G.o.d, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in G.o.d; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an ”exemplar”; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22, A. 3).
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QUESTION 16
OF TRUTH (In Eight Articles)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of G.o.d, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether G.o.d is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 1]
Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, ”That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, ”That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: ”That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
Obj. 3: Further, ”that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so,” as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.