Part I (Prima Pars) Part 32 (2/2)

Obj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by G.o.d, so are bad things, and things that G.o.d can make, but that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in G.o.d, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in G.o.d, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.

_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, ”What was made, in Him was life.” But all things were made, except G.o.d. Therefore all things are life in G.o.d.

_I answer that,_ In G.o.d to live is to understand, as before stated (A. 3). In G.o.d intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in G.o.d as understood is the very living or life of G.o.d. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by G.o.d are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in G.o.d in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in G.o.d, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, ”In Him we live, move, and be”; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by G.o.d. In another sense things are said to be in G.o.d, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in G.o.d through their proper ideas, which in G.o.d are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in G.o.d are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in G.o.d in this manner are not movement, but life.

Reply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by partic.i.p.ation.

But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has n.o.bler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Reply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in G.o.d's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in G.o.d as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by G.o.d through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in G.o.d. Those things that are not in time may be called life in G.o.d in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by G.o.d; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.

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QUESTION 19

THE WILL OF G.o.d (In Twelve Articles)

After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is will in G.o.d?

(2) Whether G.o.d wills things apart from Himself?

(3) Whether whatever G.o.d wills, He wills necessarily?

(4) Whether the will of G.o.d is the cause of things?

(5) Whether any cause can be a.s.signed to the divine will?

(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?

(7) Whether the will of G.o.d is mutable?

(8) Whether the will of G.o.d imposes necessity on the things willed?

(9) Whether there is in G.o.d the will of evil?

(10) Whether G.o.d has free will?

(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in G.o.d?

(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly a.s.signed to the divine will?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Will in G.o.d?

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