Part I (Prima Pars) Part 34 (1/2)
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since G.o.d is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (Q. 7, A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause.
Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of G.o.d is the cause of things.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from G.o.d absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply Obj. 2: Because the essence of G.o.d is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, ”Because G.o.d is good, we exist,” are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in G.o.d all these things are one.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]
Whether Any Cause Can Be a.s.signed to the Divine Will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be a.s.signed to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 46): ”Who would venture to say that G.o.d made all things irrationally?” But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of G.o.d has some cause.
Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause a.s.signed except by the will of him who wills. But the will of G.o.d is the cause of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to a.s.sign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must a.s.sign some cause to the divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of G.o.d has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 28): ”Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected.” But nothing is greater than the will of G.o.d. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
_I answer that,_ In no wise has the will of G.o.d a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as G.o.d by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in G.o.d to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.
Reply Obj. 1: The will of G.o.d is reasonable, not because anything is to G.o.d a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.
Reply Obj. 2: Since G.o.d wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of G.o.d. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): ”Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of G.o.d.”
Reply Obj. 3: Since G.o.d wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of G.o.d, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that G.o.d willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of G.o.d; but the others on the order of other causes.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 6]
Whether the Will of G.o.d Is Always Fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.
For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): ”G.o.d will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.
Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now G.o.d knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.
Obj. 3: Further, since the will of G.o.d is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of G.o.d, therefore, is not always fulfilled.