Part I (Prima Pars) Part 39 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.
Reply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.
Reply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking ”necessary” and ”contingent” are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of G.o.d, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
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QUESTION 23
OF PREDESTINATION (In Eight Articles)
After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to G.o.d?
(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?
(3) Whether to G.o.d belongs the reprobation of some men?
(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?
(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?
(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?
(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 1]
Whether Men Are Predestined by G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by G.o.d, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): ”It must be borne in mind that G.o.d foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by G.o.d; and thus man's predestination is done away.
Obj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by G.o.d. Therefore neither are men.
Obj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beat.i.tude, as well as men.
But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the ”purpose to take pity [miserendi]” [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.
Obj. 4: Further, the benefits G.o.d confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): ”Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of G.o.d: that we may know the things that are given us from G.o.d.” Therefore if man were predestined by G.o.d, since predestination is a benefit from G.o.d, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): ”Whom He predestined, them He also called.”
_I answer that,_ It is fitting that G.o.d should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by G.o.d is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing G.o.d which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by G.o.d. The reason of that direction pre-exists in G.o.d; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.
Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: ”He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.
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