Part I (Prima Pars) Part 49 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who a.s.serted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.

Reply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): ”A simple form cannot be a subject.” Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether the Word ”Person” Should Be Said of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name ”person” should not be said of G.o.d. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): ”No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles.” But the name ”person” is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.

Therefore ”person” is not to be applied to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): ”The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These ”persons” or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes.”

This, however, can apply to G.o.d only in a metaphorical sense.

Therefore the word ”person” is only applied to G.o.d metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word ”hypostasis” does not apply to G.o.d, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.

Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in G.o.d. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, ”in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey.” Therefore the word ”person”

should not be said of G.o.d.

Obj. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of ”person,” as given above, does not apply to G.o.d. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to G.o.d, as we proved above (Q. 14, A. 12); and thus G.o.d cannot be said to have ”a rational nature.” And also because G.o.d cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while G.o.d is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word ”person” ought not to be attributed to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ In the Creed of Athanasius we say: ”One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.”

_I answer that,_ ”Person” signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to G.o.d, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name ”person” is fittingly applied to G.o.d; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to G.o.d; as we showed above when treating of the names of G.o.d (Q. 13, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the word ”person” is not found applied to G.o.d in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of G.o.d in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of G.o.d only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about G.o.d in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about G.o.d. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid ”profane novelties of words” (1 Tim. 6:20).

Reply Obj. 2: Although this name ”person” may not belong to G.o.d as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to G.o.d in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name ”person” was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called ”persons.” Thence by some the definition of person is given as ”hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity.” And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a ”person.” Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name ”person” pre-eminently belongs to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: The word ”hypostasis” does not apply to G.o.d as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that ”poison lurks in this word,”

forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word ”substance,” which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply Obj. 4: It may be said that G.o.d has a rational _nature,_ if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But G.o.d cannot be called an ”individual” in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. ”Substance”

can be applied to G.o.d in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.

There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in G.o.d. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that ”Person” in G.o.d is ”the incommunicable existence of the divine nature.”

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether This Word ”Person” Signifies Relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this word ”person,” as applied to G.o.d, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.

vii, 6): ”When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son.”

Obj. 2: Further, the interrogation ”What?” refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: ”When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons.” Therefore person signifies essence.

Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of ”person” is this: ”The individual substance of the rational nature,” as above stated.