Part I (Prima Pars) Part 50 (2/2)

Whether the Numeral Terms Denote Anything Real in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in G.o.d. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in G.o.d signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is said of G.o.d and of creatures, belongs to G.o.d in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in G.o.d, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): ”If we admit companions.h.i.+p”--that is, plurality--”we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude;” and Ambrose says (De Fide i): ”When we say one G.o.d, unity excludes plurality of G.o.ds, and does not imply quant.i.ty in G.o.d.”

Hence we see that these terms are applied to G.o.d in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive.

_I answer that,_ The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in G.o.d, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however, a.s.sert the contrary.

In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species of quant.i.ty. Number in this sense is found only in material things which have quant.i.ty. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results in a mult.i.tude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of mult.i.tude is found only in immaterial things.

Some, considering only that mult.i.tude which is a species of discrete quant.i.ty, and seeing that such kind of quant.i.ty has no place in G.o.d, a.s.serted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in G.o.d, but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of mult.i.tude, said that as knowledge exists in G.o.d according to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in G.o.d there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in G.o.d in the proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quant.i.ty.

But we say that numeral terms predicated of G.o.d are not derived from number, a species of quant.i.ty, for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in G.o.d, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from mult.i.tude in a transcendent sense. Now mult.i.tude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated, as ”one” convertible with ”being”

is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity (Q. 11, A. 1); for ”one” signifies undivided being.

So, of whatever we say ”one,” we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, ”one” applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things, mult.i.tude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quant.i.ty, denotes an accident added to being; as also does ”one” which is the principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in G.o.d signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term ”one” signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature of mult.i.tude that it should be composed of units.

Reply Obj. 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is mult.i.tude; hence in G.o.d it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Mult.i.tude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quant.i.ty, and cannot be used when speaking of G.o.d: unlike transcendental mult.i.tude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of mult.i.tude is applicable to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: ”One” does not exclude mult.i.tude, but division, which logically precedes one or mult.i.tude. Mult.i.tude does not remove unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the mult.i.tude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q.

11, A. 2).

It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of G.o.ds by unity, it does not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether This Term ”Person” Can Be Common to the Three Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that this term ”person” cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the essence. But this term ”person” does not signify the essence directly.

Therefore it is not common to all three.

Obj. 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.

But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. 29, A.

3, ad 4). Therefore this term ”person” is not common to all the three persons.

Obj. 3: Further, if the name ”person” is common to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in G.o.d there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask, ”Three what?” we say, ”Three persons,” because what a person is, is common to them.

<script>