Part I (Prima Pars) Part 52 (1/2)

Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word ”alone” [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in G.o.d. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), ”He is alone who is not with another.”

But G.o.d is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that G.o.d is alone.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in G.o.d can be predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that G.o.d is wise, we can say the Father is a wise G.o.d; and the Trinity is a wise G.o.d. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): ”We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true G.o.d alone.” Therefore G.o.d cannot be said to be alone.

Obj. 3: Further if this expression ”alone” is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, ”G.o.d alone is Father,” since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, ”G.o.d alone creates,” it would follow that the ”Father alone creates,” as whatever is said of G.o.d can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression ”alone” cannot be joined to an essential term in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, ”To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only G.o.d” (1 Tim. 1:17).

_I answer that,_ This term ”alone” can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for instance, ”white” to man, as when we say a ”white man.” If the term ”alone” is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in G.o.d; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that G.o.d was solitary, against what is above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression ”every one” or ”no one”; and likewise the term ”alone,” as excluding every other _suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, ”Socrates alone writes,” we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term ”alone” being joined to any essential term in G.o.d, as excluding the predicate from all things but G.o.d; as if we said ”G.o.d alone is eternal,” because nothing but G.o.d is eternal.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with G.o.d, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in G.o.d, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by a.s.sociation with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, G.o.d would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from G.o.d; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply Obj. 2: This expression ”alone,” properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the _suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb ”only,” being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, ”Only Socrates”--that is, no one else--”runs: and Socrates runs only”--that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is G.o.d alone, or the Trinity is G.o.d alone, unless some implied meaning be a.s.sumed in the predicate, as, for instance, ”The Trinity is G.o.d Who alone is G.o.d.” In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that G.o.d Who alone is G.o.d, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that the Father is not G.o.d alone, but that the Trinity is G.o.d alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, ”To the King of ages, invisible, the only G.o.d,” as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term ”alone” be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, ”G.o.d alone is Father,” can mean two things, because the word ”Father” can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say G.o.d alone creates; nor, does it follow, ”therefore the Father alone creates,” because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, ”Man alone is a mortal rational animal,” we cannot conclude, ”therefore Socrates alone is such.”

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether an Exclusive Diction Can Be Joined to the Personal Term?

Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: ”That they may know Thee, the only true G.o.d” (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, He said: ”No one knows the Son but the Father” (Matt.

11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say ”Socrates alone is white,” that therefore ”his hand is not white,” or that ”man is not white.” But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is G.o.d, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.

Obj. 4: Further, the Church sings: ”Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ.”

_On the contrary,_ This proposition ”The Father alone is G.o.d” includes two a.s.sertions--namely, that the Father is G.o.d, and that no other besides the Father is G.o.d. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is G.o.d. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is G.o.d; and the same of the like sayings.

_I answer that,_ When we say, ”The Father alone is G.o.d,” such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If ”alone” means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.

For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being ”the Father alone is G.o.d”--that is, ”He who with no other is the Father, is G.o.d.” In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): ”We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father together with Him.” This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said ”He who alone is called the Father is G.o.d.” But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction ”alone,” properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say, ”Thee the only true G.o.d,” we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word ”only” excludes another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term ”no one” [*Nemo = non-h.o.m.o, i.e. no man] is not the same as ”no man,” which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in _suppositum,_ as part and universal. But the Son differs in _suppositum_ from the Father; and so there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High ”with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of G.o.d the Father.”

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QUESTION 32

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (In Four Articles)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?