Part I (Prima Pars) Part 60 (2/2)
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word _h.o.m.oousion,_ which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.
_I answer that,_ As above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the _suppositum_ of the form; so also in G.o.d the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.
Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: ”That woman is of a handsome figure,” or: ”This man is of perfect virtue.” In like manner, as in G.o.d the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
Reply Obj. 1: Substance is here taken for the ”hypostasis,” and not for the essence.
Reply Obj. 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, ”I and the Father are one (John 10:30),” and ”I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (John 10:38)”; and there are many other texts of the same import.
Reply Obj. 3: Because ”nature” designates the principle of action while ”essence” comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of ”one essence” which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are ”of one essence,” than by saying they are ”of one nature.”
Reply Obj. 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say ”the virtue of Peter.” On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, ”Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],” or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, ”he is a man of blood”--that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the ”divine essence”; or, the three persons are ”of one essence.”
Reply Obj. 5: The preposition ”from” or ”out of” does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, ”three persons of one essence,” taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, ”three persons from the same essence.”
Reply Obj. 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): ”It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand _h.o.m.oousion,_ what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? ... The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.”
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 3]
Whether Essential Names Should Be Predicated in the Singular of the Three Persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name ”G.o.d,”
should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as ”man” signifies ”one that has humanity,” so G.o.d signifies ”one that has G.o.dhead.” But the three persons are three who have G.o.dhead. Therefore the three persons are ”three G.o.ds.”
Obj. 2: Further, Gen. 1:1, where it is said, ”In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew original has ”Elohim,” which may be rendered ”G.o.ds” or ”Judges”: and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are ”several G.o.ds,” and not ”one” G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, this word ”thing” when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): ”The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.” Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.
Obj. 4: Further, as this word ”G.o.d” signifies ”a being who has Deity,” so also this word ”person” signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are ”three G.o.ds.”
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Deut. 6:4): ”Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy G.o.d is one G.o.d.”
_I answer that,_ Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or mult.i.tude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their _supposita._ In creatures, one form does not exist in several _supposita_ except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered mult.i.tude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in G.o.d the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7; Q. 11, A. 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are ”three men”; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are ”three G.o.ds,” but ”one G.o.d”; forasmuch as in the three _supposita_ of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of _supposita._ For we say there are three ”existent” or three ”wise” beings, or three ”eternal,” ”uncreated,” and ”immense”
beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say ”one uncreated, immense, eternal being,” as Athanasius declares.
Reply Obj. 1: Though the name ”G.o.d” signifies a being having G.o.dhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name ”G.o.d” is used substantively; whereas ”having G.o.dhead” is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are ”three having G.o.dhead,”
it does not follow that there are three G.o.ds.
Reply Obj. 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of _supposita_ the Greeks said ”three hypostases,” so also in Hebrew ”Elohim” is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to ”G.o.d” or to ”substance,”
lest plurality be referred to the substance.
Reply Obj. 3: This word ”thing” is one of the transcendentals.
Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of G.o.d in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the pa.s.sage quoted, that ”the same Trinity is a thing supreme.”
Reply Obj. 4: The form signified by the word ”person” is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
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