Part I (Prima Pars) Part 63 (1/2)
Others, therefore, considering this ident.i.ty, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not ”in” the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in G.o.d except in our way of speaking, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, however, say that there are properties in G.o.d; as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 2). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
So, since the nature of a form requires it to be ”in” that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in G.o.d, and yet is G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in G.o.d, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real ident.i.ty exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in G.o.d the abstract is the same as the concrete, as ”G.o.dhead” and ”G.o.d.” And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to G.o.d, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in G.o.d, because they are both in the divine essence.
According to this twofold ident.i.ty, property in G.o.d is the same as person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in G.o.d; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of ident.i.ty, whereby whatever is attributed to G.o.d is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (Q. 30, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of ident.i.ty; but in the persons they exist by mode of ident.i.ty, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
Reply Obj. 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a _suppositum._ Now, properties are not designated as _supposita,_ but as forms of _supposita._ And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 2]
Whether the Persons Are Distinguished by the Relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.
Obj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But ”hypostasis” signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Obj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in G.o.d cannot be relation.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): ”Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.”
_I answer that,_ In whatever mult.i.tude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are ”origin” and ”relation.” Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for ”origin” is signified by way of act, as ”generation”; and ”relation” by way of the form, as ”paternity.”
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguis.h.i.+ng principles themselves must const.i.tute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or const.i.tute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in G.o.d the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that it should const.i.tute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a pa.s.sive sense origin, as ”nativity,” signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet const.i.tuting the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name ”Father” signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term ”Begetter” or ”Begetting” signifies property only; forasmuch as this name ”Father” signifies the relation which is distinctive and const.i.tutive of the hypostasis; and this term ”Begetter” or ”Begotten” signifies the origin which is not distinctive and const.i.tutive of the hypostasis.
Reply Obj. 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves.
Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply Obj. 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.
Reply Obj. 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply Obj. 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word ”another”
signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 3]