Part I (Prima Pars) Part 70 (2/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by G.o.d.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, action and pa.s.sion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is G.o.d, so the first pa.s.sive principle is matter. Therefore G.o.d and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.
Obj. 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two ”things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself”--viz. angels--”the other nigh unto nothing”--viz. primary matter.
_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.
And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they a.s.signed certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived trans.m.u.tation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such trans.m.u.tations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac, according to Aristotle (De Gener.
ii)], or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered ”being” under some particular aspect, either as ”this” or as ”such”; and so they a.s.signed particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of ”being,” as being, and who a.s.signed a cause to things, not as ”these,” or as ”such,” but as ”beings.”
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are ”such” by accidental forms, nor according as they are ”these” by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of ”becoming” in particular--that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
Reply Obj. 2: Pa.s.sion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first pa.s.sive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
Reply Obj. 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 3]
Whether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides G.o.d?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides G.o.d. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d is not their exemplar cause.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is by partic.i.p.ation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above (A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by partic.i.p.ation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
Obj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.
Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are ”the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence.” Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.
And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore G.o.d Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the a.n.a.logy of some kind of imitation.
Reply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to G.o.d according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
Reply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by partic.i.p.ation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Reply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.
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