Part I (Prima Pars) Part 74 (1/2)

Obj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But G.o.d is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Q.

44, AA. 2, 3, 4). Since therefore G.o.d is eternal, the world is also eternal.

Obj. 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of G.o.d is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 17:5), ”Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was”; and (Prov. 8:22), ”The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning.”

_I answer that,_ Nothing except G.o.d can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that the will of G.o.d is the cause of things.

Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for G.o.d to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (Q. 19, A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that G.o.d should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for G.o.d to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as G.o.d wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of G.o.d, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.

Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who a.s.serted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in _Phys._ viii and in _De Coelo_ i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, ”whether the world is eternal.”

Reply Obj. 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a pa.s.sive power which is matter, but according to the active power of G.o.d; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it received that power, it did not exist.

Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.

Reply Obj. 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only ”in which is nothing,” but also implies a s.p.a.ce capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or s.p.a.ce before the world was.

Reply Obj. 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas. .h.i.therto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (Q. 45, A. 2, ad 2).

Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.

viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.

Reply Obj. 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of G.o.d Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time ”after” and not in time ”before,”

according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.

Reply Obj. 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), ”before” and ”after”

belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the ”now” of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant ”now,” as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys.

viii, text 10) against those who a.s.serted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.

Reply Obj. 8: G.o.d is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word ”prior” signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word ”above” signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Q. 19, A. 4; Q. 41, A. 2). Therefore, although G.o.d was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.

Reply Obj. 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of G.o.d an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as G.o.d willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 2]

Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that G.o.d is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is a.s.serted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by G.o.d, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.

But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated.

Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.