Part I (Prima Pars) Part 90 (2/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), ”The will is in the reason.” But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appet.i.te, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appet.i.te argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and will. But G.o.d's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing G.o.d. Therefore there is will in the angels.
_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appet.i.te towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called ”a natural appet.i.te.” Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called ”a sensitive appet.i.te.” Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed ”will.” Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpa.s.ses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpa.s.ses reason. Reason surpa.s.ses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appet.i.te tending towards good in the abstract, which appet.i.te belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appet.i.te belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.
Consequently the object presented to the appet.i.tive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appet.i.te higher than the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appet.i.tive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appet.i.tive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other pa.s.sions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]
Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities.
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in G.o.d, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with G.o.d, for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.
Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
Reply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good.
Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 3]
Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?
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