Part I (Prima Pars) Part 96 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beat.i.tude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beat.i.tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beat.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 8]
Whether a Beatified Angel Can Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as as said above (A. 7), beat.i.tude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the angel in beat.i.tude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that ”there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.” Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.
_I answer that,_ The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beat.i.tude consists in seeing G.o.d through His essence. Now, G.o.d's essence is the very essence of goodness.
Consequently the angel beholding G.o.d is disposed towards G.o.d in the same way as anyone else not seeing G.o.d is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards G.o.d. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail.
But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beat.i.tude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.
Reply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but a.s.sent to naturally known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to G.o.d Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards G.o.d, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.
Reply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusion by pa.s.sing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.
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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]
Whether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beat.i.tude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beat.i.tude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beat.i.tude increases.
Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beat.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that ”G.o.d makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations”; since ”they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all ... ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beat.i.tude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beat.i.tude.
Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beat.i.tude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible.
_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beat.i.tude, they are already in possession of beat.i.tude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beat.i.tude.
_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beat.i.tude, which consists in the vision of G.o.d, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A.
4), that it needs to be moved by G.o.d towards its beat.i.tude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.
Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of G.o.d, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to G.o.d only; as is evident from what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending G.o.d, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pa.s.s that the rational creature understands G.o.d more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beat.i.tude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.
Therefore every rational creature is so led by G.o.d to the end of its beat.i.tude, that from G.o.d's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beat.i.tude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pa.s.s to a higher degree.
Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely pa.s.sively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.