Part I (Prima Pars) Part 112 (1/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality partic.i.p.ate of the First Act, which is G.o.d; by partic.i.p.ation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom.
v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality partic.i.p.ate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must partic.i.p.ate of primary matter, as part of itself.
Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by G.o.d.
Therefore the soul has matter.
Obj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to G.o.d alone. Therefore the soul has matter.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
_I answer that,_ The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the ”primary animate.”
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually ”precontaining all things,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things partic.i.p.ate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act.
But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are partic.i.p.ations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all partic.i.p.ated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.
Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.
Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply Obj. 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by trans.m.u.ting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause trans.m.u.ting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form ”there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once.” [*The Leonine edition has, ”simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid.” The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, ”statim per se unum quiddam est ...
et ens quiddam.”]
Reply Obj. 4: Everything partic.i.p.ated is compared to the partic.i.p.ator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist ”per se,” must have existence by partic.i.p.ation; for ”even life,” or anything of that sort, ”is a partic.i.p.ator of existence,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now partic.i.p.ated existence is limited by the capacity of the partic.i.p.ator; so that G.o.d alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and partic.i.p.ated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that ”whereby they are” and that ”which they are”; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]
Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because ”all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast,” as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, ”the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal.” But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis. 2:2), ”We are born of nothing”; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same pa.s.sage, ”After this we shall be as if we had not been,” even as to our soul.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are ”intellectual,” and that they have ”an incorruptible substantial life.”
_I answer that,_ We must a.s.sert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence _per se_ cannot be generated or corrupted except ”per se”; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted _per se._ This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge.
Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of ”here” and ”now,” whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.
Reply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul.
For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by G.o.d. To signify this it is written as to other animals: ”Let the earth bring forth the living soul” (Gen. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen. 2:7) that ”He breathed into his face the breath of life.” And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: ”(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to G.o.d Who gave it.” Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): ”All things breathe alike,” and (Wis. 2:2), ”The breath in our nostrils is smoke.” But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: ”Man has nothing more than beasts.” Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul.