Part I (Prima Pars) Part 116 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q.
75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in G.o.d, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i).
Reply Obj. 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes subst.i.tuting accidents for substantial differences.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 2]
Whether There Are Several Powers of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of G.o.d. But in G.o.d there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul.
Obj. 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power.
Obj. 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. 76, AA. 3, 4).
Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3).
_I answer that,_ Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beat.i.tude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beat.i.tude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In G.o.d there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.
There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.
Reply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.
Reply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 3]
Whether the Powers Are Distinguished by Their Acts and Objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.
Obj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appet.i.tive.
Obj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.
_On the contrary,_ Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that ”acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites,” that is their objects.
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