Part I (Prima Pars) Part 122 (1/2)
SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]
Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) a.s.signs to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A.
4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.
_On the contrary,_ From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.
_I answer that,_ As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above (Q. 59, A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the pa.s.sive intellect is that ”in which all are in potentiality.” Wherefore the pa.s.sive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the pa.s.sive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the pa.s.sive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the pa.s.sive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.
Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of pa.s.sive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a pa.s.sive power to retain as well as to receive.
Reply Obj. 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that ”if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent.” Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
Reply Obj. 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 8]
Whether the Reason Is Distinct from the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that ”when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect.” Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.
Obj. 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.
Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that ”that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it.”
Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.
_I answer that,_ Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by a.n.a.lysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
Reply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority.
Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
Reply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 9]
Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.