Part I (Prima Pars) Part 124 (1/2)

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appet.i.tive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appet.i.tive from the cognitive powers.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.i.tive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which partic.i.p.ate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appet.i.te. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to G.o.d, ”in Whom all things pre-exist,”

as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpa.s.sing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appet.i.te. And this superior inclination belongs to the appet.i.tive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.i.tive power to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Appet.i.te is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to a.s.sign to the soul a particular power.

Reply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appet.i.te that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appet.i.te is the animal appet.i.te, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appet.i.tes Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appet.i.tes are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appet.i.tes are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.

But there is no place for this distinction in the appet.i.tive part: for since the appet.i.te is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appet.i.te regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appet.i.te is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appet.i.tive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appet.i.tive part.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appet.i.te, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appet.i.te moves the lower.

_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appet.i.te is a distinct power from the sensitive appet.i.te. For the appet.i.tive power is a pa.s.sive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appet.i.te is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De Anima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things pa.s.sive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the pa.s.sive: indeed, the pa.s.sive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appet.i.te is distinct from the sensitive.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appet.i.te except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appet.i.tive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual appet.i.te, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when ”we hate every kind of thief.” In the same way by the intellectual appet.i.te we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

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QUESTION 81

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (In Three Articles)

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sensuality is only an appet.i.tive power?

(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?

(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Sensuality Is Only Appet.i.tive?