Part I (Prima Pars) Part 125 (2/2)

Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a s.h.i.+p.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.

Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity ”does not take away the liberty of the will,” as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).

Reply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but ”the means to the end,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).

Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]

Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that ”evil is outside the scope of the will.” Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appet.i.te, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will.

But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appet.i.te of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that ”animals are moved by things seen.” Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that ”it is the will by which we sin and live well,” and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).

Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not a.s.sent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect a.s.sents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not a.s.sent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to G.o.d, in Whom alone true happiness consists.

Nevertheless, until through the cert.i.tude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to G.o.d of necessity, nor to those things which are of G.o.d. But the will of the man who sees G.o.d in His essence of necessity adheres to G.o.d, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appet.i.te in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appet.i.te--that is, the will--may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more n.o.ble.

Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more n.o.ble and perfect power than the intellect.

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