Part I (Prima Pars) Part 127 (2/2)

_I answer that,_ The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appet.i.tive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appet.i.tive power, it is required that the appet.i.te should accept the judgment of counsel.

Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs princ.i.p.ally to the appet.i.tive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either ”an appet.i.tive intellect or an intellectual appet.i.te.” But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appet.i.te when he describes choice as ”a desire proceeding from counsel.” And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appet.i.te, it follows that choice is princ.i.p.ally an act of the appet.i.tive power. And thus free-will is an appet.i.tive power.

Reply Obj. 1: The appet.i.tive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel.

Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appet.i.te: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, ”having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.” And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appet.i.te does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 4]

Whether Free-will Is a Power Distinct from the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that _thelesis_ is one thing and _boulesis_ another. But _thelesis_ is the will, while _boulesis_ seems to be the free-will, because _boulesis,_ according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because ”the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appet.i.te. But in the intellect there are two powers--the active and the pa.s.sive.

Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appet.i.te, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.

_I answer that,_ The appet.i.tive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appet.i.te we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of _understanding_ implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to _reason,_ properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appet.i.te to ”will” implies the simple appet.i.te for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to ”choose” is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we a.s.sent on account of the principles: just as, in appet.i.tive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q.

79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a pa.s.sive will.

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QUESTION 84

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (In Eight Articles)

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appet.i.tive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.

Furthermore, the acts of the appet.i.tive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

The former of these inquiries will be threefold:

(1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it;

(2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself;

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