Part I (Prima Pars) Part 143 (1/2)
Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that ”the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness.” Therefore it is made to the image of G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like G.o.d. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called ”very good” (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of G.o.d, and not only man.
Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of G.o.d: ”Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image.” Therefore the whole world is to the image of G.o.d, and not only the rational creature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): ”Man's excellence consists in the fact that G.o.d made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field.” Therefore things without intellect are not made to G.o.d's image.
_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
Whence Hilary says pointedly that ”an image is of the same species.”
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to G.o.d first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) ”approach so near to G.o.d in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him.” It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to G.o.d's image.
Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a partic.i.p.ation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to G.o.d, partic.i.p.ates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are ”contingent images of their causes”; that is, as much as they happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.
Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of G.o.d, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to G.o.d's image, but that the other parts are excluded.
Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word ”image” to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word ”image” in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 3]
Whether the Angels Are More to the Image of G.o.d Than Man Is?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of G.o.d than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon _de Imagine_ xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that G.o.d granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), ”man is so much to G.o.d's image that G.o.d did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him.” But a creature is called G.o.d's image so far as it is akin to G.o.d. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of G.o.d than man.
Obj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to G.o.d's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of G.o.d than man.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. x.x.xiv): ”The angel is called a ”seal of resemblance” (Ezech. 28:12) because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.
_I answer that,_ We may speak of G.o.d's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of G.o.d is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A.
8). Secondly, we may consider the image of G.o.d in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of G.o.d, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as G.o.d from G.o.d; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as G.o.d is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of G.o.d is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to G.o.d's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of G.o.d than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of G.o.d than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of G.o.d; but not the angels.
Reply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to G.o.d than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, ”things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer.” Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to G.o.d's image.
Reply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not partic.i.p.ate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 4]
Whether the Image of G.o.d Is Found in Every Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of G.o.d is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that ”man is the image of G.o.d, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] of man” (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): ”Whom G.o.d foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.