Part I (Prima Pars) Part 147 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same pa.s.sage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but ”he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now,” who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

Reply Obj. 3: This pa.s.sage from Augustine does not a.s.sert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that G.o.d shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.

Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.

Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Pa.s.sions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no pa.s.sions.

For by the pa.s.sions of the soul ”the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit”

(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.

Therefore in the state of innocence there were no pa.s.sions of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was n.o.bler than his body. But his body was impa.s.sible. Therefore no pa.s.sions were in his soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the pa.s.sions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the pa.s.sions were entirely excluded from him.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that ”in our first parents there was undisturbed love of G.o.d,” and other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_I answer that,_ The pa.s.sions of the soul are in the sensual appet.i.te, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some pa.s.sions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no pa.s.sion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he pa.s.sions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those pa.s.sions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appet.i.te, wherein the pa.s.sions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our pa.s.sions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appet.i.te obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appet.i.te was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the pa.s.sions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The flesh l.u.s.ts against the spirit by the rebellion of the pa.s.sions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impa.s.sible in the state of innocence as regards the pa.s.sions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was impa.s.sible as regards the pa.s.sions which impede the free use of reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the pa.s.sions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 11.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]

Whether Adam Had All the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb pa.s.sions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fort.i.tude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the pa.s.sions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the pa.s.sions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fort.i.tude with fear. But these pa.s.sions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Obj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.

Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): ”The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of G.o.d, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness.”