Part I (Prima Pars) Part 154 (1/2)
Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?
(2) What is the end of this government?
(3) Whether the world is governed by one?
(4) Of the effects of this government?
(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?
(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by G.o.d?
(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?
(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 1]
Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.
For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
Obj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
Obj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the princ.i.p.al parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:3): ”But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.” And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): ”Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal.”
_I answer that,_ Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q.
44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as ”it belongs to the best to produce the best,” it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of G.o.d should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
Reply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from G.o.d, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from G.o.d is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 2]
Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside the World?
Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): ”Some ends are an operation; some are a work”--i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.
Obj. 3: Further, the good of the mult.i.tude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the ”tranquillity of order,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a mult.i.tude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.