Part I (Prima Pars) Part 156 (2/2)
receives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an apt.i.tude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on the agent.
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this apt.i.tude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of _becoming_ but also the cause of _being._
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in _becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect partic.i.p.ation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
Now every creature may be compared to G.o.d, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so G.o.d alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by partic.i.p.ation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. iv, 12): ”If the ruling power of G.o.d were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: ”As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of G.o.d, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.”
Reply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.
Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in G.o.d, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by G.o.d in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._
Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by G.o.d is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]
Whether G.o.d Preserves Every Creature Immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d preserves every creature immediately. For G.o.d creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But G.o.d created all things immediately.
Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore G.o.d preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.
Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But G.o.d gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and _per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and princ.i.p.ally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the princ.i.p.al cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that G.o.d keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the princ.i.p.al cause of their preservation.
Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.
Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]
Whether G.o.d Can Annihilate Anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that ”G.o.d is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence.” But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.
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