Part I (Prima Pars) Part 158 (2/2)
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): ”It is G.o.d who worketh in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish.”
_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by G.o.d alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpa.s.ses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; G.o.d alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by G.o.d alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to G.o.d to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner G.o.d, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]
Whether G.o.d Works in Every Agent?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to G.o.d. If therefore G.o.d works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from G.o.d operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.
Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if G.o.d is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that G.o.d does not operate any further in the operating creature.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): ”Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us.”
_I answer that,_ Some have understood G.o.d to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that G.o.d alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but G.o.d in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that G.o.d works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.
Thus then does G.o.d work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it partic.i.p.ates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is G.o.d; it follows that G.o.d Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of G.o.d Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that G.o.d not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.
Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things G.o.d Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things G.o.d works intimately.
For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to G.o.d as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: ”Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.”
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]
Whether G.o.d Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: ”G.o.d the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.” But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore G.o.d can do nothing outside the natural order.
Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from G.o.d, so is the order of nature. But G.o.d cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d established the order of nature. Therefore it G.o.d does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.
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