Part I (Prima Pars) Part 163 (1/2)

_I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.

Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.

Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.

Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.

Reply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 4]

Whether the Distinction of Hierarchies and Orders Comes from the Angelic Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is ”a sacred princ.i.p.ality,” and Dionysius places in its definition that it ”approaches a resemblance to G.o.d, as far as may be” (Coel. Hier. iii).

But sanct.i.ty and resemblance to G.o.d is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called ”burning” or ”kindling,” as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for ”it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5): ”which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

_On the contrary,_ The Master says (ii, D. 9) that ”an angelic order is a mult.i.tude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the partic.i.p.ation of natural gifts.” Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

_I answer that,_ The order of government, which is the order of a mult.i.tude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love G.o.d by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic mult.i.tude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A.

6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 5]

Whether the Orders of the Angels Are Properly Named?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to G.o.d alone to be Lord, according to the words, ”Know ye that the Lord He is G.o.d” (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called ”Dominations.”

Obj. 3: Further, the name ”Domination” seems to imply government and likewise the names ”Princ.i.p.alities” and ”Powers.” Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

Obj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the ”Princ.i.p.alities.”

Obj. 5: Further, the name ”Seraphim” is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name ”Cherubim” from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Obj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that G.o.d knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.

Therefore there ought not to be any order of ”Thrones” besides the ”Cherubim” and ”Seraphim.” Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name ”Seraphim” is found in Isa. 6:2; the name ”Cherubim” in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); ”Thrones” in Col. 1:16; ”Dominations,” ”Virtues,” ”Powers,” and ”Princ.i.p.alities” are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name ”Archangels” in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name ”Angels” is found in many places of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of partic.i.p.ation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to G.o.d: by partic.i.p.ation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called G.o.ds by partic.i.p.ation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it partic.i.p.ates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a ”rational substance,” but not an ”intellectual substance,” which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by partic.i.p.ation; nor do we call him a ”sensible substance,” which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by partic.i.p.ation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.