Part I (Prima Pars) Part 166 (1/2)
Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.
Obj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior.
Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q.
108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that ”all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life”; and Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 6), that ”in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature.”
_I answer that,_ It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the ”here and now”; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
Reply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to a.s.sign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we a.s.sert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must a.s.sert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
Reply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and pa.s.sive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the ”active intelligence.”
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): ”Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it”; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): ”The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order”; and Origen says on the text, ”When the a.s.s saw the angel”
(Num. 22:23), that ”the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things” (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the ”powers”; so to the order of the ”virtues” do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 2]
Whether Corporeal Matter Obeys the Mere Will of an Angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Obj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their princ.i.p.al agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the princ.i.p.al place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it a.s.sumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the princ.i.p.al place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says ”It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys G.o.d alone.”
_I answer that,_ The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] a.s.serted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are partic.i.p.ations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole ”composite” as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to G.o.d alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from G.o.d, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Reply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
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