Part I (Prima Pars) Part 173 (2/2)

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, ”There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely pa.s.sive,” that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as G.o.d is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and pa.s.sive.

Reply Obj. 3: Quant.i.ty does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quant.i.ty. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quant.i.ty does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight r.e.t.a.r.ds movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.

Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from G.o.d; for it partic.i.p.ates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from G.o.d is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.

But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpa.s.s its subject in acting, but it is to surpa.s.s it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain ”causal virtues”

(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): ”Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fas.h.i.+on, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world.”

_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word ”nature” has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, ”nature,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called ”nativity”: and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word ”nature” has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and pa.s.sive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of ”seminal virtues” [seminales rationes] to all those active and pa.s.sive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.

These active and pa.s.sive virtues may be considered in several orders.

For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are princ.i.p.ally and originally in the Word of G.o.d, as _typal ideas._ Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._ Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the _seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1: These active and pa.s.sive virtues of natural things, though not called ”virtues” (rationes) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].

Reply Obj. 2: These active and pa.s.sive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the pa.s.sive principle. And thus the word ”seed”

covers both active and pa.s.sive principles.

Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, ”as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things.”

Nevertheless, the ”typal ideas” can be called ”causal virtues,” but not, strictly speaking, ”seminal virtues,” because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the pa.s.sive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that G.o.d commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the pa.s.sive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in Bodies Here Below?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): ”We say that they”--namely, the heavenly bodies--”are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes.”

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