Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 2 (2/2)
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]
Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Honors?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors.
For happiness or bliss is ”the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to G.o.d and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): ”To ... the only G.o.d be honor and glory.” Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Obj. 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.
Therefore happiness consists in honor.
_On the contrary,_ Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor.
For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness.
And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot princ.i.p.ally consist therein.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, ”as from those who have nothing greater to offer.” But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to G.o.d and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.
Reply Obj. 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Fame or Glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory.
For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): ”The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.” Therefore happiness consists in glory.
Obj. 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists ”in being well known and praised.” Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fas.h.i.+on. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): ”You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time.”
Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
_On the contrary,_ Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), ”many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise.” Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
_I answer that,_ Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists ”in being well known and praised,” as Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to G.o.d's knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas G.o.d's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fas.h.i.+on, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on G.o.d's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beat.i.tude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with G.o.d; according to Ps. 90:15, 16: ”I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.”
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since G.o.d cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor.
10:18): ”He ... is approved ... whom G.o.d commendeth.”
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