Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 4 (1/2)
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appet.i.te, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a partic.i.p.ated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which const.i.tutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which const.i.tutes happiness is something outside the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what const.i.tutes happiness is a good of the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases.
As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friends.h.i.+p there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Reply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which const.i.tutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]
Whether Any Created Good Const.i.tutes Man's Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some created good const.i.tutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom ”unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,”
from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness.
Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
Obj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
Obj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpa.s.sing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpa.s.ses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good const.i.tutes man's happiness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): ”As the soul is the life of the body, so G.o.d is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people whose G.o.d is the Lord' (Ps.
143:15).”
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created good to const.i.tute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appet.i.te altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appet.i.te, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in G.o.d alone; because every creature has goodness by partic.i.p.ation. Wherefore G.o.d alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: ”Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore G.o.d alone const.i.tutes man's happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
Reply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to G.o.d, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but G.o.d himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the partic.i.p.ated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
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QUESTION 3
WHAT IS HAPPINESS (In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?
(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?