Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 6 (1/2)
according to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought princ.i.p.ally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with G.o.d and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and princ.i.p.ally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and pa.s.sions, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 7, 8.
Reply Obj. 1: The a.s.serted likeness of the practical intellect to G.o.d is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, as G.o.d does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to G.o.d is one of union and ”information”; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the princ.i.p.al thing known, which is His Essence, G.o.d has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply Obj. 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and pa.s.sions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, G.o.d, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether Happiness Consists in the Consideration of Speculative Sciences?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that ”happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.” And in distinguis.h.i.+ng the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative virtues--”knowledge,” ”wisdom” and ”understanding,”
which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Obj. 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, ”all men naturally desire to know”; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act.
But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 9:23): ”Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom”: and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 1), and at the end of the _Posterior a.n.a.lytics_ (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown (I, Q. 88, A. 2), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a partic.i.p.ation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain partic.i.p.ation of true and perfect happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A. 2, ad 4).
Reply Obj. 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or partic.i.p.ation thereof.
Reply Obj. 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fas.h.i.+on, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether Happiness Consists in the Knowledge of Separate Substances, Namely, Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): ”It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels”; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.