Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 11 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the First Part (Q.
106, A. 1): since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by G.o.d.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 7]
Whether Any Good Works Are Necessary That Man May Receive Happiness from G.o.d?
Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from G.o.d. For since G.o.d is an agent of infinite power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above (A. 6), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore G.o.d who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
Obj. 2: Further, just as G.o.d is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when G.o.d first established nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of the man ”to whom G.o.d reputeth justice without works.” Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 13:17): ”If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them.” Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
_I answer that,_ Rect.i.tude of the will, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for G.o.d could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 12, ”of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several.” Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to G.o.d alone.
Therefore it belongs to G.o.d alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpa.s.ses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 5); whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the creature; because He inst.i.tuted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is G.o.d and Man, ”Who,” according to Heb. 2:10, ”had brought many children into glory”; therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 8]
Whether Every Man Desires Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object of the appet.i.te (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), ”some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things.” Therefore not all desire Happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that ”happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss.” But all do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): ”If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,'
he would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will.” Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
_I answer that,_ Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (AA. 3, 4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Reply Obj. 3: This definition of Happiness given by some--”Happy is the man that has all he desires,” or, ”whose every wish is fulfilled,” is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in a certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another.
For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appet.i.te, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness--that he ”desires nothing amiss”: although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that ”happy is he who has all he desires.”
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TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ. 6-21) ________________________